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Gundy v. United States  
 
Ruling Below: United States v. Gundy, 695 Fed.Appx. 639 (2nd Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Herman Gundy was convicted of a sex offense. When Gundy was transferred to federal 
custody in Pennsylvania, he received permission to travel by bus from Pennsylvania to New York 
unsupervised. As a result, Gundy was convicted and sentenced to time served plus five years 
supervised release for staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. 
 
Issue: Whether the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of 
authority to the attorney general to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violates the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
United States of America, Appellee 
v. 
Herman Avery GUNDY, AKA Herman Grundy, Defendant- Appellant 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
 
Decided on June 22, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
OETKEN, District Judge:  
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
June 16, 2016 judgment of the District Court 
is AFFIRMED.  
Defendant-appellant Herman Gundy 
appeals his conviction and sentence, 
following a bench trial on stipulated facts, for 
one count of failing to register as a sex 
offender after traveling in interstate 
commerce, in violation of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). We 
assume the parties’ familiarity with the 
underlying facts and the procedural history of 
the case, to which we refer only as necessary 
to explain our decision to affirm.  
While serving a federal sentence for 
violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306, 
Sexual Offense in the Second Degree, during 
his supervised release for a prior federal 
offense, Gundy was transferred from 
Maryland to a federal prison in Pennsylvania. 
See United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140, 
143 (2d Cir. 2015). As he approached the end 
of his federal sentence, Gundy authorized the 
Department of Justice to make arrangements 
for his move to community-based custody. 
He was ordered to be transferred to the Bronx 
Residential Re-Entry Center, a halfway 
house in New York, and he was granted a 
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furlough to travel unescorted on a 
commercial bus on July 17, 2012, from 
Pennsylvania to the Bronx. Gundy arrived at 
the Re-Entry Center as planned, and, on 
August 27, 2012, was released from federal 
custody there to a private residence in the 
Bronx. Gundy did not register as a sex 
offender in either Maryland or New York, as 
state law required, and was arrested and 
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Id. at 144. 
After the District Court granted Gundy’s 
motion to dismiss the prosecution for the 
absence of a trigger for SORNA’s 
registration requirement, this Court reversed 
the dismissal and reinstated the indictment, 
holding that the requirement was triggered 
because Gundy was “required to register” 
under SORNA no later than August 1, 2008. 
See id. at 145.  
Upon the indictment’s reinstatement, 
Gundy renewed his motion to dismiss on the 
basis that the interstate travel requirement of 
the statute was not satisfied because he was 
still in custody when he traveled from 
Pennsylvania to the Bronx. The District 
Court denied the motion, holding that the 
statute did not include an exception to the 
interstate travel element based on a 
defendant’s custodial status. The District 
Court also held that, even if the statute did 
include a voluntariness or mens rea 
requirement, the allegations of the indictment 
were sufficient for that issue to be resolved at 
trial.  
A bench trial followed on stipulated 
facts. The District Court found that each 
element of the offense had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including the 
interstate travel element and any 
voluntariness or mens rea requirement that 
may apply, and thus found Gundy guilty of 
violating § 2250. Following a sentencing 
hearing, the District Court entered judgment 
imposing a sentence of time served and a 
five-year term of supervised release. Gundy 
now appeals from that judgment.  
Section 2250(a) imposes criminal 
liability on anyone who (1) is required to 
register under SORNA; (2) travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce; and (3) 
knowingly fails to register or update a 
required registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). 
We held in our consideration of 
Gundy’s  earlier appeal that Gundy satisfies 
the first requirement. There is no dispute that 
he knowingly failed to register, thus 
satisfying the third requirement. On appeal, 
Gundy asks us to read in an exception to the 
second requirement, travel in interstate 
commerce, for a defendant who crosses state 
lines while in federal custody. He contends 
that holding otherwise would violate the 
usual requirement of criminal law that 
criminal acts be committed voluntarily. The 
parties also dispute whether, on the stipulated 
facts and conclusions of the District Court 
following the bench trial, Gundy’s travel 
from Pennsylvania to New York was 
voluntary.  
We decline to reach Gundy’s 
argument regarding the interpretation of § 
2250(a). Assuming arguendo that Gundy is 
correct and that the travel element contains an 
implicit voluntariness requirement, that 
requirement is easily met on the facts of this 
case. Although Gundy remained technically 
in federal custody when traveling to the 
halfway house in New York, the stipulated 
  375 
facts at trial are sufficient to support the 
District Court’s finding that Gundy’s travel 
was voluntary. On the basis of those facts, the 
District Court was free to conclude that 
Gundy made the trip in question willingly, as 
he authorized the initial transfer process and 
then traveled by bus to New York on his own 
recognizance. See United States v. Pierce, 
224 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that 
standard of review for sufficiency of the 
evidence is the same in a bench trial as a jury 
trial). We need not and do not reach the 
question of statutory interpretation because, 
even assuming Gundy is correct that 
interstate travel in § 2250(a) is limited to 
voluntary travel, the District Court 
reasonably found that the travel here was 
voluntary.  
*   *   * 
We have considered Gundy’s 
remaining arguments and find them to be 
without merit. 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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“Sex Offender Case May Deal Blow To 'Administrative State'” 
 
Law360 
 
Jimmy Hoover 
 
March 7, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court took up a case this 
week involving a convicted sex offender who 
failed to register as such in New York, and 
the legal question at the center of the 
proceeding could lead to a ruling that reins in 
the "administrative state" and hands 
conservatives a major win. 
 
In Gundy v. U.S., the high court has agreed 
to decide whether the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act is 
unconstitutional because, rather than saying 
whether it applies to people convicted before 
its passage, the statute simply passes that 
determination off to the attorney general. 
Petitioner Herman Gundy, whose underlying 
sex conviction occurred a year before the law 
was enacted, has said that SORNA violates 
the separation of powers. 
 
At first glance, it might seem strange that 
conservatives are looking askance at a law 
passed to get tough on sex offenders. But the 
case centers on the non-delegation doctrine, a 
thorny judicial rule forbidding Congress from 
passing laws that delegate legislative 
functions to members of the executive 
branch, in this case the attorney general. For 
conservatives, the tendency of Congress to 
hand over its constitutional duties to 
unelected federal officials is one they dearly 
want to reverse. 
The doctrine has not been used by the 
Supreme Court to strike down a law passed 
by Congress since 1935, but lawyers and 
scholars on the political right have clamored 
for its revival in recent years as federal 
regulators have grown in size and power. 
Court watchers were atwitter Monday after 
the court decided to take the case. 
“What’s interesting about this challenge is 
that the possibility that a statute anywhere 
right now might violate the non-delegation 
principle suggests a revisiting of the whole 
issue of whether the court should be in the 
business of determining how much discretion 
is too much discretion” for Congress to hand 
the executive branch, said Evan Bernick, a 
visiting lecturer at Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
Decades in the Wilderness 
Believers in the non-delegation doctrine — 
there are many skeptics — say it is based on 
Article I of the Constitution, which states, 
“All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 
Despite those early origins, the doctrine 
didn’t enjoy its heyday until 1935, when in a 
pair of now-famous cases the Supreme Court 
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struck down portions of the 1933 National 
Industrial Recovery Act — a key New Deal 
law — because they gave the president 
legislative powers over the poultry and 
petroleum industries. 
The court in the poultry case said Congress 
can’t allow the president to “exercise an 
unfettered discretion to make whatever laws 
he thinks may be needed” without first laying 
down policies and standards itself, or what’s 
since been referred to as an “intelligible 
principle.” 
But the Supreme Court quickly retreated 
from its seemingly broad rulings in those 
cases, and hasn’t wielded the scythe of the 
non-delegation doctrine to fell congressional 
statutes since. 
While the court has never explicitly 
renounced the doctrine, it has struggled over 
the years to establish a rule for when a law 
delegating power to the executive branch 
lacks an “intelligible principle” to serve as a 
guidepost for policymaking. 
Because it is still technically on the books, 
the doctrine has been called a “shotgun 
behind the door” tempering Congress’ 
inclination to pass laws with broad 
delegations of power. But Bernick said “the 
shotgun isn’t apparently loaded, and hasn’t 
been loaded for decades. It’s not really a 
threat.” 
'Second Coming of the Constitution'? 
Conservatives have sought to put teeth back 
into the doctrine for years; then-Justice 
William Rehnquist called for its return in a 
famous 1980 concurrence, while D.C. Circuit 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, in a 1993 article, 
said it was part of the “Constitution-in-exile 
... kept alive by a few scholars who labor on 
in the hope of a restoration, a second coming 
of the Constitution of liberty.” 
 
Recently, however, it has become part of a 
broader conservative attack on the 
administrative state that developed in 
response to heavy regulatory activity under 
the Obama administration. 
Among its chief proponents is the newest 
member of the Supreme Court, Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, who in a 2016 opinion while he was 
still on the Tenth Circuit suggested using 
non-delegation as a basis for 
overturning Chevron USA v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council Inc., a 1984 
Supreme Court decision that has armed 
federal agencies with a powerful tool for 
defeating rulemaking challenges. 
Gorsuch, whose opinion in that case was one 
of the reasons behind his Supreme Court 
nomination, has reiterated his desire to rein in 
administrative power through the doctrine 
since taking the nation’s top bench. “Our 
founders did not approve lawmaking made 
easy by bureaucratic fiat,” he said in a 
November speech. 
The case granted by the justices Monday will 
give him his first shot to do just that. 
An Unlikely Vehicle 
Herman Gundy was sentenced to time served 
and five years of supervised released because 
he failed to register as a sex offender after he 
was transferred from a federal prison in 
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Pennsylvania to a halfway house in New 
York. 
Gundy filed a petition with the Supreme 
Court in September, making various 
challenges to the conviction. Among them 
was his argument that SORNA violated the 
non-delegation doctrine because it gave the 
attorney general the decision of whether the 
registration requirements should apply to 
people whose sex offense convictions 
occurred prior to the law's enactment in 2006; 
Gundy was convicted of giving cocaine to an 
11-year-old girl and raping her in October 
2004, according to the government. 
“The authority to legislate is entrusted solely 
to Congress,” Gundy, who is being 
represented by the New York federal 
defenders office, said in his petition. 
“Because SORNA grants the attorney general 
unfettered discretion to determine who is 
subject to criminal legislation without an 
‘intelligible principle’ to guide this 
discretion, it violates the non-delegation 
doctrine.” 
 
Bernick said the court’s decision to take on 
the case is reflective of its “sense of unease” 
about the growth of the administrative state. 
“This sense of unease is going to inform a 
bunch of different areas of law, and I think it 
could manifest itself in a case like this,” he 
said. 
 
“What could happen in this context, you 
could see an effort on the part of the court, a 
number of members of which have expressed 
skepticism about the administrative state and 
its constitutional standing, to draw a 'thus far 
and no further' principle,” he said. 
 
Still, despite Justice Gorsuch’s passion on the 
subject, Bernick believes the court will try to 
narrow the scope of its ruling so as not to 
unleash a Pandora’s box of non-delegation 
challenges to various modern legislation, 
much of which he said confers unto agencies 
power “as great or greater than any power 
that was conferred by the National Industrial 
Recovery Act.” 
“I think that Gorsuch and [Justice Clarence] 
Thomas are both votes, if the opportunity 
arose to articulate a very robust non-
delegation principle that applies to 
everything,” he said. “My skepticism is 
whether there are more than two votes for that 
principle.” 
 
The case is Gundy v. U.S., case number 17-
6086, in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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“The Supreme Court May Revive a Legal Theory Last Used to Strike Down New 
Deal Laws” 
 
Slate 
 
Mark Joseph Stern 
 
March 5, 2018 
 
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear Gundy v. United States, a constitutional 
challenge to federal sex offender regulations. 
If, like me, you believe that America’s 
current sex offender regime is 
draconian, unjust, and counterproductive, 
that might sound like good news! And 
perhaps it is. But there’s one aspect of the 
court’s grant that may be very bad news from 
progressive viewpoint: It will only consider 
whether the policy in question violates the 
nondelegation doctrine—a hazy legal 
principle last used to strike down New Deal 
legislation in 1935. 
The law in question, the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 
required states to expand their sex offender 
registries or lose millions in federal funding. 
It also increased punishments for sex 
offenders, keeping them in the registry for 
decades, strictly limiting their freedom of 
movement, and allowing them to be detained 
for years in “civil commitment” after they 
finish serving their prison sentences. Oddly, 
Congress did not clarify whether SORNA 
must apply to sex offenders 
convicted before the law’s passage. Instead, 
it gave the attorney general authority to apply 
the law retroactively, which he did. 
Typically, the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto 
Clause prohibits the government from 
applying a new criminal law retroactively to 
punish an offender who committed his crime 
before the law’s passage. But in 2003, the 
Supreme Court rejected an Ex Post Facto 
challenge to Alaska’s retroactive sex 
offender registration act, holding that 
Alaska’s measure was not sufficiently 
“punitive” to violate the clause. 
Thus, Herman Gundy—the defendant in this 
case, who was convicted of a sex offense 
before SORNA’s passage—decided to 
challenge the federal law’s retroactivity 
under the nondelegation doctrine. Under this 
theory, Congress infringes upon the 
constitutional separation of powers when it 
delegates too much legislative authority to 
another branch of government. Here, Gundy 
asserts that Congress delegated an 
unconstitutional amount of power to the 
attorney general by allowing him to 
determine how to apply SORNA 
retroactively. 
I am simultaneously sympathetic to and 
terrified by this argument. On the one hand, 
SORNA is a truly terrible law, and I’d like to 
see it reined in. On the other 
hand, Gundy may open up a nasty can of 
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worms. The Supreme Court has deployed the 
non-delegation doctrine to strike down 
legislation precisely twice—in 1935. Both 
laws were New Deal regulations: one 
governing industrial labor laws, the other 
setting quotas on oil sales. But shortly 
thereafter, the court changed its 
attitude toward the New Deal, giving up 
efforts to police economic reforms. Since 
then, the court has largely abandoned the 
nondelegation theory, allowing Congress to 
delegate power to another branch so long 
as that power is limited by some “intelligible 
principle.” Justice Anthony 
Kennedy described the doctrine as 
“somewhat moribund” during oral arguments 
in 2014. 
In recent years, however, several 
conservative justices have expressed an 
interest in reviving nondelegation principles. 
Justice Clarence Thomas wants to bring it 
back; so does Justice Neil Gorsuch, 
who praised the doctrine as a safeguard of 
personal freedom while on the 10th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. (He also endorsed 
it in a 2017 speech to the Federalist Society.) 
Many progressives fear that, once 
resuscitated, the theory could be used to 
strike down all manner of economic 
regulations. 
It’s a reasonable concern. These days, 
Congress hands off most regulatory authority 
to a slew of federal agencies situated in the 
executive branch. A court concerned about 
nondelegation could strike down a vast range 
of liberal legislation under the doctrine. 
Labor laws and environmental protections 
would be especially vulnerable, since 
Congress gives agencies a broad mandate to 
interpret and implement these measures. If 
the Supreme Court renders that mandate 
unconstitutional, federal rules that protect 
workers’ rights, collective bargaining, clean 
air, and endangered species would fall. 
So: Should progressives panic about Gundy? 
Not quite yet. University of North Carolina 
criminal law professor Carissa Byrne 
Hessick points out that the Supreme Court 
could set different rules for the non-
delegation in the criminal context. Gorsuch 
suggested as much in his 10th Circuit 
opinion—which, in fact, involved a similar 
challenge to SORNA’s retroactivity. In an 
impressive dissent, Gorsuch wrote that 
Congress must provide something more than 
an “intelligible principle” when delegating 
prosecutorial authority given the “individual 
liberty” at stake. “If the separation of powers 
means anything,” he asserted, “it must mean 
that the prosecutor isn’t allowed to define the 
crimes he gets to enforce.” 
I think Gorsuch is probably right, but I worry 
about this court’s ability, or willingness, to 
limit the non-delegation doctrine’s revival to 
criminal cases. Gorsuch has a knack 
for reintroducing conservative principles in 
cases where they lead to a liberal outcome, 
even though the underlying rationale tilts the 
law rightward. Would this conservative 
Supreme Court cabin non-delegation to 
criminal law? Or might it succumb to the 
temptation to use this principle as a sword to 
slay economic and environmental 
regulations, too? Gundy will give us a 
glimpse of the answer.
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“Will Supreme Court push Congress to get back to its job of making law?” 
 
The Hill 
 
Mark Miller 
 
June 4, 2018   
 
In the Constitution, the opening phrase “We 
the People” vests all legislative powers in 
Congress. The power to write the federal 
laws that govern the American people 
belongs to Congress. The most important 
protection of our liberty embedded in the 
Constitution — the separation of powers 
among the three branches of our federal 
government — prohibits any branch from 
redelegating its unique powers to another 
branch. The courts call this the nondelegation 
doctrine.  
 
However, Congress, with the Supreme 
Court’s permission, has ignored that 
prohibition by delegating its lawmaking 
powers to executive agencies for more than 
80 years. These agencies are staffed with 
bureaucrats who can’t be voted out of office, 
and many blame that lack of accountability 
for the growth of the regulatory state in the 
decades since the New Deal. 
 
But the Supreme Court has signaled it may 
revoke its longstanding approval of the 
administrative status quo. It recently granted 
review of a criminal case, Gundy v. United 
States, which will allow the court to limit 
legislative powers to Congress, where they 
belong. 
The facts of the criminal case are not the 
central legal issue, but a brief explanation 
helps illustrate the constitutional problem. 
While on federal supervised release related to 
a drug charge, Herman Gundy was convicted 
in state court of a sex offense. When he 
completed his state prison sentence, the 
government transferred him to a prison in 
Pennsylvania on a different charge. While in 
Pennsylvania he received permission to 
travel to New York to serve time for that 
crime in a halfway house. He did not, 
however, register with the federal 
government as a sex offender, as required 
under the federal Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (SORNA) when a sex 
offender crosses state lines.  
 
Although Gundy’s underlying crime 
occurred prior to SORNA’s passage, 
Congress included a provision allowing the 
U.S. attorney general to decide if the law 
would apply retroactively to offenders who 
committed SORNA crimes before the law’s 
passage. The attorney general decided it 
would, issued a regulation that said as much, 
and then charged Gundy for violating 
SORNA when he crossed state lines without 
registration. 
 
Gundy challenged this conviction on a 
number of grounds, but the Supreme Court 
agreed to review the case for one reason: to 
determine whether Congress’s use of 
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SORNA to delegate its lawmaking power to 
the attorney general — regarding whether the 
law should apply to criminals who committed 
crimes before it was enacted — violates the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
 
The court last struck down a statute for 
violating the nondelegation doctrine in 1935. 
The court’s acceptance of the Gundy case, 
solely on this issue, signals a willingness to 
revisit this doctrine and perhaps resurrect it. 
In the case, the Supreme Court will decide 
whether Congress overstepped its 
constitutional bounds by empowering the 
attorney general to unilaterally make law.  
 
Although the nondelegation doctrine does not 
prevent Congress from “obtaining the 
assistance of its coordinate branches,” as the 
court has said, it does require Congress to 
minimally explain — by way of what the 
court has called “an intelligible principle” — 
what it wants the federal agency to do. But 
unsurprisingly, Congress often fails to muster 
any principle, intelligible or otherwise, to 
explain what it expects the agency to do. 
 
Such is the case here. The attorney general’s 
regulation applying SORNA’s registration 
requirement retroactively to Gundy’s crimes 
before the act’s passage may be a legitimate 
decision, but it is a decision for Congress to 
make, according to the Constitution.  
 
Like Gundy, American businesses face 
retroactive applications of new regulatory 
standards all the time. For example, 
regulatory agencies reinterpret a broad 
statutory term, such as what constitutes a 
wetland, and then conclude that a landowner 
violated the Clean Water Act in years past. 
Or, they narrow the definition of “normal 
farming practices” by regulation and then 
deny the statutory exemption to American 
farmers for normal farming practices based 
on practices conducted before the regulation 
was finalized. 
 
And the voter cannot punish the writer of 
these commands because Congress cleverly 
has passed the lawmaking buck to 
bureaucrats who cannot be voted out of 
office. That is the rub — our Founding 
Fathers delegated the lawmaking authority to 
Congress, and then made legislators 
responsible to the people by allowing the 
people to vote them in or out of office every 
two years, according to how Congress abused 
or properly used its lawmaking power.  
 
Congress insulates itself from this 
accountability by shirking its lawmaking 
responsibility and handing it off to 
bureaucrats. The Supreme Court should use 
the Gundy case to put a stop to this 
purposeful avoidance of accountability. 
 
To be clear: if Gundy wins his case, his 
conviction for not registering under SORNA 
would be reversed, but Congress would then 
most likely amend the law to require 
registration for old crimes. That puts the 
lawmaking onus back on Congress where it 
belongs. In reality, this case is less about 
Gundy than it is about the Supreme Court 
reining in the regulatory state run amok, and 
requiring Congress to get back to doing its 
job.
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“United States v. Gundy” 
 
Justia 
 
Justia Inc. 
 
September 15, 2015 
 
The Government appealed the district court's 
dismissal of an indictment against defendant 
and denial of its motion for reconsideration. 
Defendant was indicted for violation of the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The 
district court held that defendant did not 
violate section 2250(a) because defendant 
was not “required to register” until shortly 
before his release from custody and thus after 
the interstate travel charged in the 
Indictment. The court reversed and 
remanded, concluding that defendant was a 
person “required to register” under SORNA 
beginning at the latest on August 1, 2008, the 
effective date of the Attorney General’s final 
guidelines. This date arrived well before his 
alleged travel from Pennsylvania to New 
York. The district court thus erred in 
concluding that defendant became a person 
“required to register” under SORNA only 
after traveling interstate. 
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Nielsen v. Preap 
 
Ruling Below: Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) 
 
Overview: Three lawful residents were taken into custody by immigration authorities and were 
detained without bond hearings years after they completed serving their sentence for an offense 
that could have led to their removal. As a result, a class action for habeas relief was filed. Preap 
focuses on a federal law that allows the Department of Homeland Security to detain non-citizens 
convicted of specified crimes until proceedings take place to deport them.  
 
Issue: Whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. S 
1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security 
does not take him into immigration custody immediately. 
 
Mony PREAP; Eduardo Vega Padilla; Juan Lozano Magdaleno, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department Of Homeland Security; Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney 
General; Timothy S. Aitken; Gregory Archambeault; David Marin, Defendants-Appellants 
 
United States District Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on August 4, 2016 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:  
 
Every day in the United States, the 
government holds over 30,000 aliens in 
prison-like conditions while determining 
whether they should be removed from the 
country. Some are held because they were 
found, in a bond hearing, to pose a risk of 
flight or dangerousness. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); 
8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Others, however, are 
held without bond because they have 
committed an offense enumerated in a 
provision of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c). Aliens in this latter group are subject 
to the INA’s mandatory detention provision, 
which requires immigration authorities to 
detain them “when [they are] released” from 
criminal custody, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), and 
to hold them without bond, 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)(2). A broad range of crimes is 
covered under the mandatory detention 
provision, from serious felonies to 
misdemeanor offenses involving moral 
turpitude and simple possession of a 
controlled substance. 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1226(c)(1)(A)–(D).  
 
This mandatory detention provision 
has been challenged on various grounds. See, 
e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 
(2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
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provision against a due process challenge); 
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078–
81 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez III), cert. 
granted sub nom., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 
15-1204, 2016 WL 1182403 (June 20, 2016) 
(holding that detainees are entitled to a bond 
hearing after spending six months in 
custody). Here, we are faced with another 
such challenge; this time, regarding the 
meaning of the phrase “when [they are] 
released” in § 1226(c)(1), and whether it 
limits the category of aliens subject to 
detention without bond under § 1226(c)(2). 
Specifically, we must decide whether an alien 
must be detained without bond even if he has 
resettled into the community after release 
from criminal custody. If the answer is no, 
then the alien may still be detained, but he 
may seek release in a bond hearing under § 
1226(a) by showing that he poses neither a 
risk of flight nor a danger to the community. 
Addressing this issue requires us to consider 
the interaction of the two paragraphs of the 
mandatory detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c). Paragraph (1) requires the Attorney 
General (“AG”) to “take into custody any 
alien who [commits an offense enumerated in 
subparagraphs (A)– (D)] when the alien is 
released [from criminal custody].” 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)(1). Paragraph (2) prohibits the 
release of “an alien described in paragraph 
(1)” except in limited circumstances 
concerning witness protection. 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)(2). Plaintiffs argue that the phrase 
“when . . . released” in paragraph (1) applies 
to paragraph (2) as well, so that an alien must 
be held without bond only if taken into 
immigration custody promptly upon release 
from criminal custody for an enumerated 
offense. The government, by contrast, argues 
that “an alien described in paragraph (1)” is 
any alien who commits a crime listed in §§ 
1226(c)(1)(A)– (D) regardless of how much 
time elapses between criminal custody and 
immigration custody. According to the 
government, individuals not detained “when 
. . . released” from criminal custody as 
required by paragraph (1) are still considered 
“alien[s] described in paragraph (1)” for 
purposes of the bar to bonded release in 
paragraph (2).  
 
To date, five of our sister circuits 
have considered this issue, and four have 
sided with the government. Significantly, 
however, there is no consensus in the 
reasoning of these courts. The Second and 
Tenth Circuits found that the phrase “an alien 
described in paragraph (1)” was ambiguous, 
and thus deferred to the BIA’s interpretation 
of the phrase to mean “an alien described in 
subparagraphs (A)–(D) of paragraph (1).” 
See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 612 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (“Consistent with Chevron, we are 
not convinced that the interpretation is 
‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute.’” (quoting Adams v. Holder, 
692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012))); Olmos v. 
Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“The text, the statutory clues, and canons of 
interpretation do not definitively clarify the 
meaning of § 1226(c).”). The Fourth Circuit 
has held that “when . . . released” means any 
time after release, but it did so under a 
misconception that the BIA  had so 
interpreted the phrase. Hosh v. Lucero, 680 
F.3d 375, 380–81 (4th Cir. 2012). Finally, the 
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits applied the 
loss-of-authority rule, finding that the AG’s 
duty to detain criminal aliens under § 
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1226(c)(1) continues even if the government 
fails to comply with the “when . . . released” 
condition. See, e.g., Sylvain v. Atty Gen. of 
United States, 714 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding that “[e]ven if the statute calls 
for detention ‘when the alien is released,’ and 
even if ‘when’ implies something less than 
four years, nothing in the statute suggests that 
immigration officials lose authority if they 
delay”); see also Lora, 804 F.3d at 612; 
Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1325–26.  
 
On the other hand, the government’s 
position has been rejected by most district 
courts to consider the question and, most 
recently, by three of six judges sitting en banc 
in the First Circuit. See Castañeda v. Souza, 
810 F.3d 15, 18–43 (1st Cir. 2015) (en banc) 
(Barron, J.). In an opinion written by Judge 
Barron, these three judges concluded that the 
statutory context and legislative history make 
clear that aliens can be held without bond 
under § 1226(c)(2) only if taken into 
immigration custody pursuant to § 1226(c)(1) 
“when . . . released” from criminal custody, 
not if there is a lengthy gap after their release. 
See id. at 36, 38.  
 
We agree with Judge Barron and his 
two colleagues. The statute unambiguously 
imposes mandatory detention without bond 
only on those aliens taken by the AG into 
immigration custody “when [they are] 
released” from criminal custody. And 
because Congress’s use of the word “when” 
conveys immediacy, we conclude that the 
immigration detention must occur promptly 
upon the aliens’ release from criminal 
custody. 
 
I. 
The named Plaintiffs in this case are 
lawful permanent residents who have 
committed a crime that could lead to removal 
from the United States. Plaintiffs served their 
criminal sentences and, upon release, 
returned to their families and communities. 
Years later, immigration authorities took 
them into custody and detained them without 
bond hearings under § 1226(c). Plaintiffs 
argue that because they were not detained 
“when . . . released” from criminal custody, 
they were not subject to mandatory detention 
under § 1226(c).  
 
Mony Preap, born in a refugee camp 
after his family fled Cambodia’s Khmer 
Rouge, has been a lawful permanent resident 
of the United States since 1981, when he 
immigrated here as an infant. He has two 
2006 misdemeanor convictions for 
possession of marijuana. Years after being  
released at the end of his sentences for these 
convictions, Preap was transferred to 
immigration detention upon serving a short 
sentence for simple battery (an offense not 
covered by the mandatory detention statute) 
and held without a bond hearing. Since the 
instant litigation began, Preap has been 
granted cancellation of removal and released 
from immigration custody.  
 
Eduardo Vega Padilla has been a 
lawful permanent resident since 1966, shortly 
after he came to the United States as an 
infant. Padilla also has two drug possession 
convictions—one from 1997 and one from 
1999—and a 2002 conviction for owning a 
firearm with a prior felony conviction. 
Eleven years after finishing his sentence on 
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that last conviction, he was placed in removal 
proceedings and held in mandatory detention. 
Padilla eventually obtained release after 
receiving a bond hearing under our decision 
in Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 
F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013), in which we 
held that the government’s detention 
authority shifts from § 1226(c) to § 1226(a) 
after a detainee has spent six months in 
custody; Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 
1060, 1078–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez 
III), cert. granted sub nom., Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, No. 15- 1204, 2016 WL 1182403 
(June 20, 2016). 
 
Juan Lozano Magdaleno has been a 
lawful permanent resident since he 
immigrated to the United States as a teenager 
in 1974. Magdaleno has a 2000 conviction 
for owning a firearm with a prior felony 
conviction, and a 2007 conviction for simple 
possession of a controlled substance. He was 
sentenced to six months on the possession 
charge and released from jail in January 
2008. Over five years later, Magdaleno was 
taken into immigration custody and held 
without bond pursuant to § 1226(c). He also 
was later released from detention following a 
Rodriguez hearing.  
 
These three Plaintiffs filed a class 
action petition for habeas relief in the 
Northern District of California. The district 
court granted their motion for class 
certification, certifying a class of all 
“[i]ndividuals in the state of California who 
are or will be subjected to mandatory 
detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and 
who were not or will not have been taken into 
custody by the government immediately 
upon their release from criminal custody for 
a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The district 
court also issued a preliminary injunction 
requiring the government to provide all class 
members with bond hearings under § 
1226(a). Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D. 566, 
571, 584 (N.D. Cal. 2014). This appeal 
followed.  
 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction to review this 
class action habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. The jurisdiction-stripping provision 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), which bars judicial 
review of discretionary agency decisions 
regarding immigrant detention, does not bar 
us from hearing “challenges [to] the statutory 
framework that permits [petitioners’] 
detention without bail.” Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 517 (2003). We review questions 
of statutory construction de novo. United 
States v. Bert, 292 F.3d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 
2002).  
 
III. 
 
The government’s authority to detain 
immigrants in removal proceedings arises 
from two primary statutory sources.8 The 
first, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), grants the AG 
discretion to arrest and detain any alien upon 
the initiation of removal proceedings.9 Under 
this provision, the AG may then choose to 
keep the alien in detention, or allow release 
on conditional parole or bond. 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(a)(1)–(2). 
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If the AG opts for detention, the alien 
may seek review of that decision at a hearing 
before an immigration judge (“IJ”), 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.1(d)(1), who may overrule the AG and 
grant release on bond, id. § 1003.19. The 
alien bears the burden of proving his 
suitability for release, and the IJ should 
consider whether he “is a threat to national 
security, a danger to the community at large, 
likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail 
risk.” Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 
40 (BIA 2006); see also 8 § C.F.R. 
1236.1(c)(8).  
 
The second provision is 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c), the mandatory detention provision 
at issue in this case. Importantly, this 
provision operates as a limited exception to § 
1226(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (“Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section . . 
.”). Section 1226(c) reads as follows:  
 
 
(a) Arrest, detention, and release  
 
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, 
an alien may be arrested and detained 
pending a decision on whether the alien is to 
be removed from the United States. Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section and 
pending such decision, the Attorney 
General–  
 
(1) may continue to detain the 
arrested alien; and  
 
(2) may release the alien on–  
 
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with 
security approved by, and 
containing conditions prescribed 
by, the Attorney General; or 
 
 (B) conditional parole[.]  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
 
(c) Detention of criminal aliens  
 
(1) Custody  
 
The Attorney General shall take into 
custody any alien who –  
 
(A) is inadmissible by reason 
of having committed any 
offense covered in section 
1182(a)(2) of this title,  
 
(B) is deportable by reason of 
having committed any 
offense covered in section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), 
(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of 
this title, 
 
(C) is deportable under 
section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) 
of this title on the basis of 
an offense for which the 
alien has been sentence 
[sic] to a term of 
imprisonment of at least 1 
year, or  
 
(D) is inadmissible under 
section 1182(a)(3)(B) of 
this title or deportable 
under section 
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title  
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when the alien is released, without 
regard to whether the alien is released 
on parole, supervised release, or 
probation, and without regard to 
whether the alien may be arrested or 
imprisoned again for the same 
offense. 
 
(2) Release 
 
The Attorney General may 
release an alien described in 
paragraph (1) only if the Attorney 
General decides pursuant to [the 
Federal Witness Protection 
Program] that release of the alien 
from custody is necessary . . . 
[and] the alien will not pose a 
danger to . . . safety . . . and is 
likely to appear for any scheduled 
proceeding.  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (emphases added) 
(footnote omitted). We must decide the 
proper scope of this mandatory detention 
exception, and specifically whether it applies 
to aliens who are not promptly placed in 
removal proceedings upon their release from 
criminal custody for an offense listed in § 
1226(c)(1)(A)–(D).  
 
The government advances three 
arguments to support its view that Plaintiffs 
are subject to mandatory detention under § 
1226(c). First, it argues that we should give 
Chevron deference, as have the Second and 
Tenth Circuits, to the BIA’s interpretation 
that the phrase “an alien described in 
Paragraph (1)” means “an alien described in 
subparagraphs (A)–(D) of paragraph (1),” 
thus subjecting all criminal aliens who have 
committed one of the listed crimes to 
mandatory detention regardless of when they 
were taken into immigration custody. See In 
re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 121 (BIA 
2001). Second, the government argues that 
we should follow the Fourth Circuit in 
holding that “when . . . released” is a duty-
triggering clause, not a time-limiting clause, 
and that, as such, it merely informs the AG 
when the duty to detain arises, not when the 
duty must be performed. Hosh v. Lucero, 680 
F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2012). Third, the 
government argues that we should follow the 
Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits in holding 
that, even if Congress intended that 
immigration authorities promptly detain 
criminal aliens when they are released from 
criminal custody, Congress did not clearly 
intend that they would lose the authority to do 
so in the event of delay. 
 
We find all three arguments 
unpersuasive. We agree with Judge Barron 
and his colleagues on the First Circuit in 
Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 19, that the 
government’s positions contradict the intent 
of Congress expressed through the language 
and structure of the statute.  
 
A. 
 
We first address the government’s 
argument that we should defer to the BIA’s 
interpretation of § 1226(c)(2)’s phrase “an 
alien described in paragraph (1)” to mean “an 
alien described in subparagraphs (A)–(D) of 
paragraph (1).” See Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 
125 (“We construe the phrasing ‘an alien 
described in paragraph (1),’ as including only 
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those aliens described in subparagraphs (A) 
through (D) of section [(c)(1)], and as not 
including the ‘when released’ clause.”). 
Under this interpretation, § 1226(c)(2)’s 
detention-without-bond requirement applies 
to any alien who has committed an offense 
enumerated in § 1226(c)(1), regardless of 
how long after release from criminal custody 
he or she was taken into immigration 
custody. This interpretation is at odds with 
the statute, which unambiguously links the 
“when . . . released” custody instruction in § 
1226(c)(1) to the without-bond instruction in 
§ 1226(c)(2), such that the latter applies only 
after the former is satisfied.  
 
When faced with a question of 
statutory interpretation, our analysis begins 
“with the text of the statute.” Yokeno v. 
Sekiguchi, 754 F.3d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2014). 
The words of a statute should be accorded 
their plain meaning, as considered in light of 
“the particular statutory language at issue, as 
well as the language and design of the statute 
as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). We cannot look to 
the statute’s language in isolation because 
“[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain 
words or phrases may only become evident 
when placed in context.” FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
132 (2000). “If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).  
 
Starting with the text, we find that § 
1226(c)(2) is straightforward. It refers simply 
to “an alien described in paragraph (1),” not 
to “an alien described in subparagraphs 
(1)(A)–(D).” We must presume that 
Congress selected its language deliberately, 
thus intending that “an alien described in 
paragraph (1)” is just that—i.e. an alien who 
committed a covered offense and who was 
taken into immigration custody “when . . . 
released.” See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 964 v. BF 
Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructurers Grp., 
387 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there.” (quoting Conn. 
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–
54 (1992))). Certainly, had Congress wanted 
to refer only to “an alien described in 
subparagraphs (A)–(D),” it could have done 
so. And while we recognize that “Congress 
has not always been consistent in how it 
refers to other subsections in the same 
statute,” Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1320 (describing 
a separate provision where Congress referred 
to “subparagraph (a)” but the context made it 
obvious that Congress was referring to only 
subparts (i) and (ii)), we observe that, unlike 
the example cited by the Third Circuit in 
Olmos, this section’s context supports, rather 
than contradicts, the plain meaning. 
 
As mentioned, there are two relevant 
sources of authority for the government’s 
detention of aliens in removal proceedings—
§ 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Section 1226(a) 
provides for discretionary detention of any 
alien in removal proceedings, while § 
1226(c) provides a limited exception of 
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mandatory detention for a specified group of 
aliens. Thus, if the government is not 
authorized to detain an alien under the narrow 
exception of § 1226(c), it may only do so 
under the general rule of § 1226(a). 
Critically, however, each of these sections 
includes its own corresponding instructions 
for releasing detained aliens—§ 1226(a) 
provides for possible release on bond, while 
§ 1226(c) forbids any release except under 
special circumstances concerning witness 
protection. There is one important 
consequence of this structure: under both the 
general detention provision in § 1226(a) and 
the mandatory detention provision in § 
1226(c), the authority to detain and the 
authority to release go hand in hand. That is, 
an alien detained under § 1226(a) is clearly 
subject to the release provisions of § 1226(a), 
whereas one detained under § 1226(c) is 
subject to the release provisions in § 1226(c). 
Accordingly, if an alien is not detained in 
immigration custody “when . . . released” 
from criminal custody, as required under § 
1226(c)(2), then the government derives its 
sole authority to detain that alien from § 
1226(a)(1), and, as a consequence, it must 
provide the alien with a bond hearing as 
required under § 1226(a)(2).  
 
The BIA’s interpretation in In re 
Rojas flouts this structure. The BIA held that 
the “when . . . released” clause was 
“address[ed] . . . to the statutory command 
that the ‘Attorney General shall take into 
custody’ certain categories of aliens,” but that 
it did not define the categories of aliens 
subject to the prohibition on bonded release 
in § 1226(c)(2). In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
at 121. The BIA thereby held, in essence, that 
the AG can fail to comply with the “when . . 
. released” requirement of § 1226(c)(1)—
thereby necessarily relying on § 1226(a) for 
its authority to take custody of an alien—but 
still apply the release conditions of § 
1226(c)(2). In other words, even if § 
1226(c)(1) authorizes the custody of only 
those aliens who are detained “when [they 
are] released” from criminal custody, not 
those who are detained at a later time, the 
BIA would still apply § 1226(c)(2)’s 
proscription on bonded release from 
immigration custody. This reading simply 
fails to do justice to the statute’s structure. 
See Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 26 (noting that 
under the BIA’s reading, the statute is “oddly 
misaligned” because it necessarily “de-
link[s] the ‘Custody’ directive in § 
1226(c)(1) from the bar to ‘Release’ in 
(c)(2)”).  
 
The headings in § 1226(c) further 
illustrate this point. Section 1226(c) as a 
whole is entitled “Detention of criminal 
aliens.” This heading conveys to the reader 
that the section provides an exception to the 
general detention rule of § 1226(a), and that 
this exception concerns the detention of 
certain criminal aliens. The two paragraphs 
within the section are entitled “Custody” and 
“Release.” These headings inform the reader 
that the section governs the full life cycle of 
the criminal aliens’ detention, with the first 
paragraph specifying the requirements for 
taking them into custody, and the second 
specifying the restrictions on their release. 
This structure suggests only one logical 
conclusion: the release provisions of § 
1226(c)(2) come into effect only after the 
government takes a criminal alien into 
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custody according to § 1226(c)(1). And, 
correspondingly, if the government fails to 
take an alien into custody according to § 
1226(c)(1), then it necessarily may do so only 
under the general detention provision of § 
1226(a), and we never reach the release 
restrictions in § 1226(c)(2).  
 
Rojas’s contrary reading, as Judge 
Barron explained, would mean that Congress 
directed the AG to hold without bond aliens 
“who had never been in criminal custody”— 
because with the “when . . . released” clause 
rendered inoperative for purposes of § 
1226(c)(2), there would be nothing to impose 
a requirement of the aliens ever having been 
in custody. Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 27. At the 
same time, Rojas’s reading would leave the 
AG “complete discretion to decide not to take 
[such aliens] into immigration custody at all.” 
Id. These incongruous consequences further 
persuade us to reject the BIA’s reading.  
 
Notably, neither the BIA nor those 
circuits that deferred to the BIA adequately 
addressed the structure of the relationship 
between § 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Indeed, the 
BIA and the Second Circuit failed to address 
it at all. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 
611 (2d Cir. 2015) (deeming it ambiguous 
whether the “when . . . released” clause “is 
part of the definition of aliens subject to 
mandatory detention” without considering 
statutory context); In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. at 121–22 (considering statutory context 
but failing to acknowledge the relationship 
between § 1226(a) and § 1226(c)). The Tenth 
Circuit did address it, and even seemed to 
agree with our conclusion that custody must 
be authorized under paragraph (1) of § 
1226(c) in order for paragraph (2) to take 
effect. Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1321 (recognizing 
that the authority to detain “arises in 
Paragraph ‘1’” and that “the [AG] must 
exercise this responsibility ‘when the alien is 
released’”). But, applying the loss-of-
authority doctrine, that court concluded that 
the government maintains its authority to 
take custody of an alien under § 1226(c)(1) 
even when it fails to comply with the “when 
. . . released” requirement. Olmos, 780 F.3d 
at 1321–22 (“With the alien in the [AG’s] 
custody under his delayed enforcement of § 
1226(c)(1), there would be nothing odd about 
§ 1226(c)(2)’s restrictions on when the alien 
can be released.”). Finding that the “when . . 
. released” requirement imposed no actual 
limitations on the government, the Tenth 
Circuit thus concluded that the BIA’s 
interpretation—reading out the “when . . . 
released” requirement—was reasonable. Id. 
We disagree. As we later explain, the loss-of-
authority doctrine does not apply to § 
1226(c). And absent this doctrine, we are left 
with the conclusion that the AG must comply 
with § 1226(c)(1), including the “when . . . 
released” requirement, before it can apply § 
1226(c)(2).  
 
In sum, we conclude that paragraph 
(2)’s limitations on release unambiguously 
depend upon paragraph (1)’s mandate to take 
custody. “An alien described in paragraph 
(1)” is therefore one who is detained 
according to the requirements of paragraph 
(1). These requirements include the mandate 
that the government take the alien into 
custody “when . . . released.” The BIA’s 
interpretation to the contrary is 
impermissible. 
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B. 
 
We must next decide whether the AG 
is in compliance with § 1226(c)(1)’s custody 
mandate—and thus § 1226(c)(2)’s 
limitations on release apply—even if the AG 
takes an alien into custody after substantial 
time has passed since the alien’s release from 
criminal custody. Plaintiffs argue that § 
1226(c)(1)’s mandate requiring the AG to 
detain criminal aliens “when [they are] 
released” from criminal custody means that 
they must be taken into custody promptly 
after release, not years later, as were the 
named Plaintiffs here. The government, on 
the other hand, argues that the phrase “when 
. . . released” is ambiguous, supporting either 
Plaintiffs’ reading or a broader reading 
requiring mandatory detention of any 
criminal alien arrested by the AG at any point 
after release from criminal custody. The 
government’s argument wrongly assumes 
that the BIA had so construed “when . . . 
released.” On the contrary, the BIA explicitly 
stated that “[t]he statute does direct the [AG] 
to take custody of aliens immediately upon 
their release from criminal confinement.” 
Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 122 (emphasis 
added). And even if the BIA had construed 
the phrase not to require immediate 
confinement, the statute would foreclose that 
construction because “when . . . released” 
unambiguously requires promptness.  
 
Again, we start with the plain 
language: “The Attorney General shall take 
into custody any alien who [commits an 
enumerated offense] when the alien is 
released [from criminal custody].” 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c). As Judge Barron observed, the first 
thing that leaps out is that “Congress chose a 
word, ‘when,’ that naturally conveys some 
degree of immediacy as opposed to a purely 
conditional word, such as ‘if.’” Castañeda, 
810 F.3d at 37 (citation omitted). Of course, 
the word “when” has multiple dictionary 
definitions. But looking to context, which of 
these meanings is the intended one is clear. 
The word “when” used in a command such as 
this one requires prompt action. Consider a 
teacher’s common instruction to stop writing 
when the exam ends. There is no doubt that 
such an instruction requires the student to 
immediately stop writing at the end of the 
exam period. Or as one district court noted, 
“if a wife tells her husband to pick up the kids 
when they finish school, implicit in this 
command . . . is the expectation that the 
husband is waiting at the moment” school 
ends. Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 1136, 1155 (D. Colo. 2013); see 
also Khoury v. Asher, 3 F. Supp. 3d 877, 887 
(W.D. Wash. 2014) (“A mandate is 
meaningless if those subject to it can carry it 
out whenever they please.”). Similarly, the 
use of the phrase “when . . . released,” when 
paired with the directive to detain, 
unambiguously requires detention with 
“some degree of immediacy.” Hosh v. 
Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 
Indeed, “[i]f Congress really meant 
for the duty in (c)(1) to take effect ‘in the 
event of’ or ‘any time after’ an alien’s release 
from criminal custody, we would expect 
Congress to have said so, given that it spoke 
with just such directness elsewhere in the 
IIRIRA.” Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 38 (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“[T]he alien shall be 
removed under the prior order at any time 
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after the reentry.” (emphasis added)); see 
also Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F. Supp. 
2d 1221, 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting 
that Congress “easily could have used the 
language ‘after the alien is released,’ 
‘regardless of when the alien is released,’ or 
other words to that effect”). But instead 
Congress chose words that signal an 
expectation of immediate action. See Jones v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999) 
(“Statutory language must be read in context 
[as] a phrase ‘gathers meaning from the 
words around it.’” (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. 
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))). 
This word choice must be given its due 
weight.  
 
Moreover, unlike the government’s 
interpretation, our reading is consistent with 
Congress’s purposes in enacting the 
mandatory detention provision—to address 
heightened risks of flight and dangerousness 
associated with aliens who commit certain 
crimes, which are serious enough to give rise 
to criminal custody. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 
518–19 (describing evidence before 
Congress). These purposes are ill-served 
when the critical link between criminal 
detention and immigration detention is 
broken and the alien is set free for long 
stretches of time. Congress’s concerns over 
flight and dangerousness are most 
pronounced at the point when the criminal 
alien is released. Consequently, we can be 
certain that Congress did not intend to 
authorize delays in the detention of these 
criminal aliens. And correspondingly, 
without considering the aliens’ conduct in 
any intervening period of freedom, it is 
impossible to conclude that the risks that 
once justified mandatory detention are still 
present. These considerations are prudently 
reflected in Congress’s decision that these 
individuals must be detained “when . . . 
released,” and that if they aren’t, the AG may 
detain them only if warranted under the 
general detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(a), upon a bond hearing during which 
an individualized assessment of risks is 
conducted. We therefore conclude that the 
phrase “when . . . released” connotes some 
degree of immediacy.  
 
C. 
 
Finally, we turn to the government’s 
argument that even if § 1226(c)(1) 
unambiguously requires prompt detention, 
we should nonetheless uphold the AG’s 
authority to detain without bond an alien who 
committed a covered offense even when the 
AG has violated the mandate of § 1226(c)(1). 
The government points to a line of cases 
holding that: “[i]f a statute does not specify a 
consequence for noncompliance with 
statutory timing provisions, the federal courts 
will not in the ordinary course impose their 
own coercive sanction.” Barnhart v. Peabody 
Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 (2003) (quoting 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)); see also 
id. at 158 (“Nor, since Brock [v. Pierce 
County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986)], have we ever 
construed a provision that the government 
‘shall’ act within a specified time, without 
more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding 
action later.”); United States v. Nashville, C 
& St. L. Ry., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886); 
United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1027 
(10th Cir. 2009). Under this “loss-of-
  396 
authority” line of cases, the government’s 
argument goes, the AG’s failure to timely 
take into custody a criminal alien in no way 
affects her ability to act pursuant to the 
mandatory detention provision of § 
1226(c)(2). Several circuits have agreed. See 
Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 157; Lora, 804 F.3d at 
612– 13; Olmos, 780 F.3d at 1324–26.  
 
The courts adopting this reasoning 
rely on United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 
495 U.S. 711 (1990), in which the Supreme 
Court interpreted a provision of the Bail 
Reform Act that required judicial officers to 
hold a bond hearing “immediately upon the 
[defendant]’s first appearance before the 
judicial officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). 
Montalvo-Murillo didn’t receive a timely 
hearing under this provision, and the district 
court released him from custody. The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a 
failure to comply with the first appearance 
requirement does not defeat the 
government’s authority to seek detention of 
the person charged.” 495 U.S. at 717. The 
Court noted that nowhere did the statute 
provide for the release of pretrial detainees as 
a remedy for the failure by judicial officers to 
provide prompt hearings. Id. And it 
concluded that “[a]utomatic release 
contravene[d] the object of the statute, to 
provide fair bail procedures while protecting 
the safety of the public and assuring the 
appearance . . . of defendants . . . .” Id. at 719. 
To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would 
“bestow upon the defendant a windfall” and 
impose on the public “a severe penalty” by 
“mandating release of possibly dangerous 
defendants every time some deviation” from 
the statute occurred. Id. at 720. Looking to 
this decision, our sister circuits have treated 
Montalvo-Murillo as a “close[] analog” to the 
dispute over § 1226(c)’s limitations. Sylvain, 
714 F.3d at 158. We find, however, that 
Montalvo-Murillo is readily distinguishable.  
 
Critically, unlike in Montalvo-
Murillo, the government here invokes the 
loss-of-authority doctrine to justify extending 
a statutory provision that in fact curtails, 
rather than expands, the government’s 
discretionary authority. See Farrin R. Anello, 
Due Process and Temporal Limits on 
Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 
Hastings L. J. 363, 367 (2014) (“The 
[mandatory detention provision] strips the 
immigration judge of her power to conduct a 
bond hearing and decide whether the 
individual poses any danger or flight risk, and 
likewise precludes DHS from making 
discretionary judgments about whether 
detention is appropriate.”). Indeed, the sole 
practical effect of the district court’s decision 
in this case is to reinstate the government’s 
general authority, under § 1226(a), to decline 
to detain, or to release on bond, those 
criminal aliens who are not timely detained 
under § 1226(c). In short, we decline to apply 
the loss-of-authority doctrine where, as here, 
there is no loss of authority. 
 
Moreover, unlike the district court’s 
ruling in Montalvo-Murillo, our holding does 
not craft a new remedy inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme. Whereas in Montalvo-
Murillo the statute at issue did not identify a 
remedy for a delayed hearing, see United 
States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 876 F.2d 826, 
831 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (noting that 
“Congress did not provide . . . the remedy” 
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for a violation of § 3142(f)), overruled by 
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 722), here the 
statutory structure makes clear precisely what 
occurs in the absence of prompt detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c): the general 
detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 
applies. Far from imposing a 
judiciallycreated remedy for untimely 
detention, we are merely holding that under 
the statute, the conditions for the mandatory 
detention exception are not met when 
detention is too long delayed. See Castañeda, 
810 F.3d at 40–41 (distinguishing several 
cases where courts improperly fashioned 
their own sanctions).  
 
We do not share the Third Circuit’s 
concern that failing to apply the loss-of-
authority doctrine “would lead to an outcome 
contrary to the statute’s design: a dangerous 
alien would be eligible for a hearing—which 
could lead to his release—merely because an 
official missed the deadline.” Sylvain, 714 
F.3d at 160. Congress’s design of protecting 
the public by detaining criminal aliens is 
undoubtedly premised on the notion that 
recently released criminal aliens may be 
presumed a risk. Such a presumption carries 
considerably less force when these aliens live 
free and productive lives after serving their 
criminal sentences. See Saysana v. Gillen, 
590 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2009) (“By any 
logic, it stands to reason that the more remote 
in time a conviction becomes and the more 
time after a conviction an individual spends 
in a community, the lower his bail risk is 
likely to be.”). Indeed, the imposition of 
robotic detention procedures in such cases 
not only smacks of injustice, but also drains 
scarce detention resources that should be 
reserved for those aliens who pose the 
greatest risks.  
 
We therefore hold that the mandatory 
detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 
applies only to those criminal aliens who are 
detained promptly after their release from 
criminal custody, not to those detained long 
after.  
 
IV. 
 
In so holding, we are not suggesting 
that the mandate to detain “when . . . 
released” necessarily requires detention to 
occur at the exact moment an alien leaves 
criminal custody. The plain meaning of 
“when . . . released” in this context suggests 
that apprehension must occur with a 
reasonable degree of immediacy. Accord 
Hosh, 680 F.3d at 381 (“[W]e agree that 
Congress’s command . . . connotes some 
degree of immediacy . . . .”); Rojas, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. at 122 (“The statute does direct the 
[AG] to take custody of aliens immediately 
upon their release from criminal 
confinement.”). Thus, depending on the 
circumstances of an individual case, an alien 
may be detained “when . . . released” even if 
immigration authorities take a very short 
period of time to bring the alien into custody.  
 
This appeal, however, does not 
present the question exactly how quickly 
detention must occur to satisfy the “when . . . 
released” requirement. The class was defined 
as those who were not “immediately 
detained” but were still taken into mandatory 
custody, and the government did not 
challenge the class definition on the ground 
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that it required further clarification as to the 
meaning of “immediately.” Nor did the 
government appeal class certification on the 
ground that the named class members were 
not typical of the class as a whole—even 
though the named Plaintiffs spent years in 
their home communities after completing 
their criminal sentences, whereas some class 
members presumably were released for 
shorter times. We thus need not decide for 
purposes of the instant appeal exactly how 
promptly an alien must be brought into 
immigration custody after being released 
from criminal custody for the transition to be 
immediate enough to satisfy the “when . . . 
released” requirement. The district court 
granted preliminary injunctive relief to a 
class of aliens who were not “immediately 
detained” when released from criminal 
custody, and that grant of relief accords with 
our interpretation of the statutory 
requirements. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Under the plain language of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c), the government may detain 
without a bond hearing only those criminal 
aliens it takes into immigration custody 
promptly upon their release from triggering 
criminal custody.  
 
AFFIRMED. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Immigrants Jailed For Past Crimes Can Be 
Detained Pending Deportation” 
 
 
The Los Angeles Times 
 
David G. Savage  
 
March 19, 2018 
 
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide 
another case testing the Trump 
administration's power to arrest and jail 
immigrants facing deportation, including 
longtime lawful residents who committed 
minor offenses years ago. 
 
The justices will review a class-action ruling 
from California that held that immigrants 
who were released after serving time in local 
and state jails may not be detained later by 
federal immigration agents for possible 
deportation and held indefinitely without a 
hearing, if they pose no danger to the public 
and are not likely to flee. 
Administration lawyers appealed the ruling 
of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 
arguing that federal law calls for "mandatory 
detention" for all noncitizens who face 
possible deportation because of a criminal 
record. 
 
They said the 9th Circuit's approach would 
lead to a "gap in custody" and "frustrate the 
[government's] ability to remove deportable 
criminal aliens from the United States." And 
they placed part of the blame on "state and 
local jurisdictions [that] do not always 
cooperate" with federal efforts to arrest 
immigrants who are leaving jails. 
 
The case, to be heard in the fall, sets up 
another clash between "sanctuary" cities and 
counties and federal immigration agents who 
seek to detain and deport immigrants who 
have criminal records. 
 
In deciding the case, the 9th Circuit said that 
more 30,000 non-citizens are held every day 
in the United States in "prison-like 
conditions" while they challenge the 
government's efforts to deport them. The 
judges said the mandatory-detention rule 
covers those with a "broad range of crimes" 
on their records, from violent felonies to 
simple drug possession. And it applies to 
longtime, lawful residents who have lived 
and worked in the United States for decades, 
they said. 
 
The lead plaintiff in the challenge to this 
provision, Mony Preap, was born in a 
Cambodian refugee camp and has been a 
lawful permanent resident since 1981. He 
was convicted on two counts of marijuana 
possession in 2006, a misdemeanor offense. 
Agents of the Department of Homeland 
Security took him into custody in 2013 under 
the disputed part of the immigration law, 
which says the DHS "shall take into custody 
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any alien" who was convicted of a 
"deportable" offense "when the alien is 
released." 
 
Preap joined a class-action suit brought by 
the American Civil Liberties Union to 
challenge the government's view that he was 
subject to mandatory detention seven years 
after his release. A federal judge in San 
Francisco and the 9th Circuit agreed with the 
challengers and said the phrase "when the 
alien is released" referred only to the time of 
their release. Because Preap had been 
released years earlier, he was not subject to 
mandatory detention in 2013 for the past 
offenses, the appeals court said. 
 
"We therefore hold that the mandatory 
detention provision … applies only to those 
criminal aliens who are detained promptly 
after their release from criminal custody, not 
to those detained long after," wrote Judge 
Jacqueline Nguyen. 
The Supreme Court kept the government's 
appeal on hold while it decided a related case. 
In Jennings vs. Rodriguez, the court ruled last 
month that federal law did not give jailed 
immigrants a right to a bail hearing after six 
months in custody. However, the justices sent 
that case back to the 9th Circuit to rule on 
whether indefinite detention without a 
hearing violated the Constitution. 
 
The new case, Nielsen vs. Preap, concerns a 
part of the same immigration law but focuses 
on a different group of lawful immigrants 
who had served jail time for a criminal 
offense. 
 
Lawyers for Preap and the other plaintiffs in 
the case had urged the court to turn down the 
administration's appeal. "Instead of focusing 
mandatory detention on high-risk individuals 
who are coming out of criminal custody, the 
government's expansive interpretation would 
sweep up individuals who have been living 
peaceably in the community for more than a 
decade and pose neither a danger nor a flight 
risk," they said. 
 
They cited a second plaintiff, Eduardo Vega 
Padilla, who came to the United States as a 
toddler and has been a lawful permanent 
resident since 1966. He was convicted of 
drug possession in 1997 and for keeping an 
unloaded pistol in a shed behind his house. 
He served six months in jail, but was arrested 
11 years later under the mandatory-detention 
provision of the federal law. Padilla was later 
released on bond because he posed no flight 
risk. 
 
Preap was released after winning his fight 
against deportation. 
 
But the Supreme Court said it would hear the 
case of Nielsen vs. Preap in the fall to decide 
whether federal law requires mandatory 
detention for all non-citizens who have past 
crimes that could trigger their deportation. 
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“Supreme Court to Consider How Fast Government Must Act in Detaining 
Immigrants For Deportation” 
 
 
The Washington Post  
 
Robert Barnes 
 
March 19, 2018 
 
There is a split in the lower courts on whether 
federal officials must act immediately after 
the person is released from criminal custody 
to detain them indefinitely as they await 
deportation proceedings. The case will be 
heard in the term that begins in October. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
said that unless the arrest is prompt, the 
detainee should receive a hearing to 
determine whether they may be freed 
awaiting the outcome of the deportation 
proceedings. Immigrants would have to 
convince an immigration judge that they 
posed no danger to others and were not a 
flight risk. 
Other lower courts have agreed with the 
government’s reading that detention is 
mandatory no matter when the noncitizen is 
picked up. 
The government argues that the 9th Circuit’s 
approach will lead to a “gap in custody” and 
hamper the federal government’s ability to 
remove deportable immigrants. The Trump 
administration said the efforts of “sanctuary 
cities” reluctant to cooperate with federal 
authorities escalate the difficulties. 
The Obama administration took the same 
reading of the law, but the stakes are higher 
with President Trump’s vow to remove more 
noncitizens who have committed crimes that 
make them deportable. 
The 9th Circuit case involved two people in 
unrelated cases. 
Mony Preap was born in a refugee camp after 
his parents fled Cambodia, and he has lived 
legally in the United States since 1981. He 
was convicted in 2006 of marijuana 
possession, but was not picked up by federal 
authorities after he was sentenced to time 
served. 
He served another criminal sentence for 
battery in 2013, a charge that is not a 
deportable offense. He was detained for 
months, but was released and no longer faces 
deportation. 
Bassam Yusuf Khoury has been a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States since 
1976. In 2011, he was released after serving 
a 30-day sentence for a drug charge. Nearly 
two years later, federal authorities picked him 
up for deportation and he was detained for 
more than six months before a judge said he 
could be released 
The issue concerns language in the federal 
law that authorizes the Department of 
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Homeland Security to seize someone for 
deportation “when the alien is released” from 
criminal custody. 
The federal government says it could mean 
any time after the release, not just 
immediately after the release. 
Lawyers for the detainees say that under the 
government’s reading, that would impose 
mandatory deportation “on individuals who 
have been released months, years, or even 
more than a decade earlier, and who therefore 
have an actual record of living at liberty in the 
community without posing any flight risk or 
danger to others.” 
The court decided a related case last month. 
On a 5-to-3 vote, the court said federal law 
did not require a bond hearing even after 
months or years of detention of those facing 
deportation.  
The case to be heard is Nielsen v. Preap. 
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“More Detained Immigrants Are Owed Bond Hearings: 9th Circ.” 
 
 
Law360 
 
Allissa Wickham 
 
August 5, 2016 
 
Only criminally convicted immigrants who 
enter immigration custody soon after being 
released from criminal custody can be 
detained without bond hearings, the Ninth 
Circuit decided Thursday in a ruling that also 
upheld a lower court’s class certification in 
the case. 
 
A three-judge appellate panel ruled that a 
mandatory detention section of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act applies 
exclusively to immigrants who were detained 
“promptly” after being let out of criminal 
custody, not to people who were detained 
much later. 
 
“The statute unambiguously imposes 
mandatory detention without bond only on 
those aliens taken by the [Attorney General] 
into immigration custody ‘when [they are] 
released’ from criminal custody,” wrote 
Circuit Judge Jacqueline Nguyen. “And 
because Congress’s use of the word ‘when’ 
conveys immediacy, we conclude that the 
immigration detention must occur promptly 
upon the aliens’ release from criminal 
custody.” 
 
The class action was filed by three 
immigrants in late 2013, and although the 
complaint isn't publicly available, a later 
order from the court stated that the plaintiffs 
were challenging their detention without 
bond. The lower court granted the 
petitioners’ motion for class certification and 
issued an injunction forcing the government 
to hold bond hearings for all the class 
members, according to the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling. 
 
The Ninth Circuit panel upheld the lower 
court’s class certification ruling and the 
preliminary injunction. According to Keker 
& Van Nest LLP, which served as co-counsel 
for the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
means that “thousands” of immigrants in 
California can now make a case against being 
detained. 
 
“The Court specifically struck down the 
government’s practice of subjecting 
immigrants to mandatory detention based on 
crimes they may have committed years ago, 
even if those individuals had long since 
rehabilitated themselves,” the firm said in a 
statement. 
 
Michael Tan, a staff attorney at the ACLU 
Immigrants' Rights Project, added in the 
statement, “Today's decision is a victory for 
fairness and due process of law.” The ACLU 
also served as counsel for plaintiffs in the 
case. 
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On the same day, the Ninth Circuit also 
affirmed a lower court’s order certifying a 
class of immigrant detainees and finding the 
class could have bond hearings in a case 
called Khoury v. Asher. Matt Adams, legal 
director for the Northwest Immigrant Rights 
Project, which represented plaintiffs in that 
case, said in a statement that his team is “very 
happy that the Court has rejected the 
government's efforts to overstep their 
authority in denying thousands of individuals 
their basic right to a custody hearing.” 
 
A representative for the U.S. Department of 
Justice did not respond to a request for 
comment. 
 
Bond hearings are an active topic in the 
immigration legal world. In June, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided to hear a case about 
whether certain immigrants are entitled to an 
automatic bond hearing after six months of 
detention, adding another layer to the 
national debate over immigrant detention. 
 
The plaintiffs in the first case, Preap v. 
Johnson, are represented by Julia Harumi 
Mass at the ACLU Foundation of Northern 
California, by Alison Edith Pennington, 
Jingni Zhao and Anoop Prasad at the Asian 
Law Caucus, by Ashok Ramani of Keker & 
Van Nest LLP and by Michael K.T. Tan of 
the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation. 
 
The government is represented by Hans 
Harris Chen, Leon Fresco and Troy David 
Liggett. 
 
The plaintiffs in the Khoury case are 
represented by Matt Adams and Christopher 
Strawn at the Northwest Immigrant Rights 
Project, by Robert Pauw at Gibbs Houston 
Pauw, by Judy Rabinovitz at the ACLU 
Immigrants' Rights Project, by Michael K.T. 
Tan at the ACLU and by Devin T. Theriot-
Orr of Sunbird Law PLLC. 
 
The government in that case is represented by 
Timothy Michael Belsan, Hans Harris Chen, 
Leon Fresco and Lori Warlick. 
 
The cases are Mony Preap, et al v. Jeh 
Johnson, et al, case number 14-16326, and 
Bassam Khoury, et al v. Nathalie Asher, et al, 
case number 14-35482, at the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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“A Power Grab of Sorts, Buried in a Supreme Court Decision” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Noah Feldman 
 
June 24, 2018 
 
As the U.S. Supreme Court’s swing justice, 
Anthony Kennedy is used to making big 
headlines in June. On Thursday, he did 
something just as important as issuing a 
major decision — but considerably harder to 
capture in a few words. 
 
In a brief, solo concurrence in Pereira v. 
Sessions, Kennedy called for reconsidering 
and maybe overruling one of the cornerstones 
of modern administrative law, known as 
“Chevron deference.” If the Chevron 
precedent is overturned, judges would have 
more direct power to overrule policy 
decisions made by agencies like the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Federal Communications Commission and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
Depending on how you count, Kennedy is the 
fifth sitting justice to call Chevron into doubt. 
His opinion is an opportunity to take a hard 
look at whether the end of the doctrine would 
be a bad thing or a good one. 
 
The Chevron doctrine, created by the 
Supreme Court in 1984 in a case involving 
the Chevron oil company, says that, when 
Congress has passed a law that is both 
ambiguous and directed to an administrative 
agency, the courts will defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of the law, so long as it is 
reasonable. 
 
For years, judges on both ends of the political 
spectrum embraced the doctrine. Liberals 
like Justice Stephen Breyer, a former 
academic scholar of administrative law, 
appreciated the way the doctrine empowered 
technocratic experts at the agencies and 
discouraged judges from second-guessing 
them. 
 
Conservatives like the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia (who was also an administrative law 
scholar before becoming a judge) found the 
doctrine appealing because it reflected the 
value of judicial restraint, making it harder 
for courts to reverse agency action from the 
Ronald Reagan era. 
 
In Scalia’s influential interpretation of 
Chevron deference, the doctrine made 
jurisprudential sense because Congress was 
in effect telling judges to listen to the 
agencies. Scalia thought judges should listen 
to Congress and do as little as possible on 
their own. 
 
But today’s judicial conservatism is not your 
father’s judicial conservatism. Scalia’s 
theoretical commitment to judicial restraint 
(never mind whether he consistently 
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practiced it) has been replaced by 
conservative judicial activism. 
 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, while still an appellate 
judge, openly criticized the Chevron doctrine 
for taking the power to interpret the law away 
from judges and giving it to agencies. That 
resonates with a core value held by Kennedy, 
that the judiciary (in practice: Kennedy) must 
always have definitive say over the meaning 
of the law. 
 
Gorsuch clerked for Kennedy, and 
Kennedy’s new opinion reflects a circular 
path of influence: Kennedy taught Gorsuch 
about judicial supremacy; Gorsuch used that 
to attack Chevron; now Gorsuch is 
influencing Kennedy to apply his own values 
to Chevron, too. 
 
Kennedy and Gorsuch make two. Justice 
Clarence Thomas, the court’s only true, all-in 
originalist, has his doubts about whether 
administrative agencies, undreamed-of by the 
founders, are even constitutional in the first 
place. You can be sure he doesn’t like a 
doctrine that empowers the agencies. Chief 
Justice John Roberts hasn’t called for the 
doctrine to go, but he has criticized the 
overuse of Chevron before. That makes four. 
 
Justice Samuel Alito may be a wildcard. On 
the one hand, he has criticized agency 
overreach in reliance on supposedly 
“ambiguous” statutes. In a speech to the 
conservative Federalist Society in 2016, 
Alito went so far as to claim (with some 
plausibility) that “before his death, [Scalia] 
was also rethinking the whole question of 
Chevron deference.” That suggests that Alito 
could join his conservative colleagues. 
 
On the other hand, in last week’s case, Alito 
wrote a separate dissent of his own saying 
that Chevron deference should have been 
applied because the statute in question was 
ambiguous. In his punchline, he wrote that 
“unless the court has overruled Chevron in a 
secret decision that has somehow escaped my 
attention, it remains good law.” 
 
This may conceivably imply that Alito is not 
ready to jettison Chevron. It’s noteworthy, 
too, that while Kennedy’s concurrence cited 
opinions by Roberts, Thomas and Gorsuch, it 
didn’t cite any Alito opinion calling Chevron 
into question. 
 
If Alito is on board with the other 
conservatives, what then? Liberals are 
already worrying that the end of Chevron 
would invite activist conservatives to 
overturn agency action. That’s a logical fear. 
If the conservatives want to end Chevron, it’s 
at least partly because they want to be able to 
constrain future Democratic-controlled 
agencies. No matter what happens after 
Donald Trump’s presidency, we are going to 
have a more conservative judiciary because 
of his appointees. 
 
Yet the truth is that liberals can’t really 
mourn the end of Chevron too hard, because 
liberals like judicial activism. Most liberals 
since World War II aren’t really committed 
to judicial restraint — except when liberals 
don’t have five votes on the Supreme Court. 
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Deep in liberals’ hearts, they know that 
courts exist to interpret the law and must 
often do so in the light of values. Scalia’s 
fantasy that judges could be mere objective 
rubber stamps is one that liberals must 
recognize as unrealistic in many situations. 
 
Seen from this perspective, the end of 
Chevron could be bad for the environment, 
bad for the internet, bad for securities 
regulation, as conservative judges overturn 
agency regulation. 
But the end of judicial deference to agencies 
won’t be bad for the rule of law itself. That 
rule is strengthened when judges — however 
fallible, however motivated — use reason to 
say what the law is, and take responsibility 
for their judgments. 
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“The Federalist Society’s Chevron Deference Dilemma” 
 
 
Law and Liberty 
 
Christopher J. Walker 
 
April 3, 2018 
 
In 2016 here at Law and Liberty, 
I asked whether administrative law’s judicial 
deference doctrines matter. Leveraging 
my study with Kent Barnett 
on Chevron deference in the federal courts of 
appeals, I argued that these doctrines do 
matter. In this essay, I explore the related 
question of whether Chevron deference 
advances its stated objectives. In particular, 
does Chevron deference constrain 
partisanship in judicial decisionmaking? The 
answer to this question has important 
implications for the current debate on 
whether to narrow, or even 
eliminate, Chevron deference. 
For the uninitiated, Chevron deference is the 
judicial doctrine that federal agencies—and 
not courts—are the primary interpreters of 
statutes that Congress has charged the 
agencies to administer. “If a statute is 
ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s 
construction is reasonable,” Justice Thomas 
has explained, “Chevron requires a federal 
court to accept the agency’s construction of 
the statute, even if the agency’s reading 
differs from what the court believes is the 
best statutory interpretation.” 
In recent years, there has been a 
growing call to 
eliminate Chevron deference. This call has 
come from the Hill, the federal bench, and the 
legal academy. Last year it was front and 
center during the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s hearing on Neil Gorsuch’s 
nomination to the Supreme Court, as then-
Judge Gorsuch had authored a 
concurring opinion critical 
of Chevron deference and its progeny. That 
Gorsuch concurrence was quite reminiscent 
of Justice Thomas’s earlier attack 
on Chevron deference in his concurring 
opinion in Michigan v. EPA. Indeed, last 
week, the New York Times reported there’s a 
new “litmus test” for judicial nominees, 
which was applied in the selection of 
Gorsuch for the Supreme Court: “reining in 
what conservatives call ‘the administrative 
state.’” 
The call to eliminate Chevron deference has 
largely come from those right of center. But 
it would be a mistake to conclude that 
everyone center-right is, or should be, in 
favor of eliminating administrative law’s 
deference doctrines. There is deep divide on 
the right with respect to the role of federal 
courts in our constitutional republic. Some 
view courts as a critical safeguard of liberty, 
and thus encourage courts to actively engage 
in checking the actions of the political 
branches. Think Randy Barnett and Philip 
Hamburger. Others, by contrast, argue that 
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because federal courts are not democratically 
accountable, they should exercise judicial 
restraint, embrace the “passive virtues” when 
possible, and otherwise adopt a minimalist 
and deferential approach to judicial review of 
actions by the political branches. Think 
Michael Stokes Paulsen and Adrian 
Vermeule. 
For years, if not decades, the proper role of 
federal courts has thus been subject to an 
ongoing and vigorous debate within the 
Federalist Society and related circles. 
Indeed, the Chevron Court 
itself grounded this deference doctrine in part 
on the need to reserve political (or policy) 
judgments for the more politically 
accountable agencies: 
“Judges are not experts in the field, and 
are not part of either political branch of 
the Government. Courts must, in some 
cases, reconcile competing political 
interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In 
contrast, an agency to which Congress 
has delegated policy-making 
responsibilities may, within the limits of 
that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments. 
While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy 
choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or 
intentionally left to be resolved by the 
agency charged with the administration 
of the statute in light of everyday 
realities.” 
In other words, Chevron deference strives to 
remove politics from judicial 
decisionmaking. Such deference to the 
political branches has long been a bedrock 
principle for at least some judicial 
conservatives. 
Does Chevron deference achieve this goal of 
removing politics from judicial 
decisionmaking? 
In an article forthcoming in the Vanderbilt 
Law Review, Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, 
and I attempt to answer this question 
empirically. To do so, we leverage 
our Chevron dataset that includes every 
published circuit-court decision that 
involved Chevron or Skidmore deference 
from 2003 through 2013. Over this eleven-
year period, the federal courts of appeals 
reviewed 1,613 agency statutory 
interpretations in 1,382 published opinions 
where they considered applying either 
deference doctrine. 
Contrary to prior, more limited studies, we 
find that Chevron deference has a powerful 
constraining effect on partisanship in judicial 
decision-making. To be sure, we still find 
some statistically significant results as to 
partisan influence. But the overall picture 
provides compelling evidence that 
the Chevron Court’s objective to reduce 
partisan judicial decision-making has been 
quite effective. 
First, like earlier studies, we find that politics 
does play some role in how circuit courts 
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review agency statutory interpretations. 
Liberal three-judge panels, for instance, are 
more likely to agree with liberal agency 
interpretations and less likely to agree with 
conservative interpretations. Vice versa for 
conservative panels. When we separate how 
conservative and liberal panels act in cases in 
which they apply Chevron deference, 
however, we find that Chevron deference 
significantly constrains judicial discretion. 
For instance, the most liberal-judge panels 
agree with conservative agency statutory 
interpretations 51% of the time when they 
apply the Chevron deference framework, 
compared to just 18% when they don’t. The 
most conservative-judge panels similarly 
agree with liberal agency interpretations 66% 
of the time with Chevron deference, and only 
18% without. 
That does not mean that Chevron eliminates 
political behavior entirely. When it comes to 
conservative agency interpretations, there’s a 
23% difference in the likelihood of panels 
across the ideological spectrum agreeing with 
the agency under Chevron deference (and a 
higher 36% difference when panels applied a 
lesser form of deference). We found a similar 
25% difference for review of liberal agency 
interpretations under Chevron. When the 
circuit courts do not apply Chevron, that 
difference rises to a staggering 63% 
difference. 
When the circuit courts decide to apply 
the Chevron framework, they largely apply it 
in a similar fashion, with only modest 
ideological behavior. Conservative panels, 
for example, were as much as 21% more 
likely than liberal panels to find no ambiguity 
when reviewing a liberal agency 
interpretation, whereas liberal panels were as 
much as 14% more likely than conservative 
panels to find no ambiguity when reviewing 
conservative agency interpretations. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Justice Scalia’s 
view (rearticulated recently by Judge 
Kethledge), we do not find that conservative 
judges are more likely to find statutes 
unambiguous regardless of the valence of the 
agency interpretation. 
We also find no “whistleblower effects.” 
Whistleblower effects, as Cass Sunstein and 
others have explained, involve the 
phenomenon of group polarization, in that 
“[d]eliberating groups of like-minded people 
tend to go to extremes.” The presence of a 
panelist with opposing political preferences 
can serve as a whistleblower of sorts, which 
helps rein in the majority’s preference of 
politics over legal doctrine in a given case. 
Contrary to the famous Cross and 
Tiller study, we find no whistleblowing 
effects in the Chevron deference context: 
Whether a panel is ideologically uniform or 
diverse does not affect whether circuit courts 
apply the Chevron framework, nor does it 
affect agency-win rates on judicial review. 
Indeed, we find only minor differences at 
even the ideological extremes, and those 
differences are strangely in the opposite 
direction than expected. This finding might 
seem surprising in light of the earlier, most-
limited empirical studies that found such 
panel effects. But it’s not too surprising in 
light of our other findings. 
Because Chevron deference itself largely 
constrains partisanship in judicial decision-
making, the ideological composition of the 
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panel may have little, if any, additional 
constraining role to play. 
We also had a bit of fun looking at individual 
judges who had at least 20 observations in our 
dataset. Some liberal judges, including Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt and then-Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor, affirmed 100% of liberal agency 
interpretations. But a few liberal judges, 
including Judges Marjorie Rendell and 
Robert Sack, indicate conservative behavior. 
Likewise, a number of conservative judges 
did not engage in ideological decision-
making, though some did, including Judges 
Jane Roth and Michael Fisher. A number of 
conservative judges more favorably reviewed 
liberal interpretations than conservative ones. 
Judge Peter Hall voted to adopt 100% of 
liberal interpretations. Other prominent 
conservative judges, such as Judges Frank 
Easterbrook, Thomas Griffith, David 
Sentelle, and Jeffrey Sutton, similarly 
demonstrated counter-ideological voting 
patterns. 
In sum, the findings from our study 
underscore one significant and largely 
overlooked cost of eliminating or 
narrowing Chevron deference: Such reform 
could result in partisanship playing a larger 
role in judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations. It may turn out that, even with 
this cost taken into account, some on the right 
would conclude that such reform efforts 
produce a net benefit. For many, however, 
the cost of increased partisan judicial 
decision-making should be a cause for 
concern. 
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“Undue Deference” 
 
 
National Review 
 
Jonathan Wood 
 
July 29, 2018 
 
For the second time in two years, President 
Trump has nominated a justice to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. His 
selection of Brett Kavanaugh, like the 
selection of Justice Neil Gorsuch before him, 
shows the White House’s commitment to 
selecting judges “devoted to a legal doctrine 
that challenges the broad power federal 
agencies have to interpret laws and enforce 
regulations,” as the New York Times has put 
it. 
 
If confirmed, that devotion may be quickly 
tested. Led by Texas, 17 states 
have urged the Supreme Court to take 
up California Sea Urchin Commission v. 
Combs and end Chevron deference — the 
Court’s controversial and unconstitutional 
practice of deferring to agencies on the 
meaning of statutes, rather than having 
independent judges interpret the law. 
 
For too long, the states argue, the 
convenience of bureaucrats has been 
weighted more heavily than fairness to the 
American people. 
 
“It is doubtless convenient for federal 
agencies to have little restraint on their 
interpretation of federal law; to be able to 
change their minds at any time, for any 
reason; and to receive deference even for 
interpretations expressed retroactively,” the 
states acknowledge. But “there is a price to 
be paid for these conveniences, and it is paid 
by those who are subject to the agency’s 
regulatory authority.” 
 
California Sea Urchin 
Commission demonstrates just how far we’ve 
strayed from the Constitution’s design of 
courts subjecting government actions to fair, 
independent scrutiny. In 1986, Congress 
struck a compromise that would encourage 
the recovery of California’s sea-otter 
population while minimizing unnecessary 
impacts on fishermen. That compromise held 
for decades, during which the otter 
population increased dramatically. 
 
But in 2012, a federal agency decided it no 
longer liked the deal Congress had struck. So 
it reinterpreted the compromise, concluding 
— conveniently — that the law allowed the 
agency to keep its benefits from the bargain 
while depriving the fishermen of theirs. 
Represented by Pacific Legal Foundation, the 
fishermen sued, arguing that nothing in the 
law passed by Congress gave the agency such 
power to rewrite the law. 
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Unfortunately, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court 
of Appeals — which embraces blind 
deference to federal agencies with more zeal 
than most courts — concluded that this didn’t 
matter. The court ruled that a federal agency 
can do whatever it pleases, so long as there’s 
no law that explicitly forbids the precise 
action. The court gave no answer as to just 
how Congress was supposed to anticipate 
every novel idea an agency might dream up 
over decades. 
 
With Kavanaugh on the bench, the Supreme 
Court may finally be ready to 
revisit Chevron and restore meaningful, 
independent scrutiny to the administrative 
state. 
When courts reassert themselves and enforce 
the law as written by Congress, it “helps 
preserve the separation of powers and 
operates as a vital check on expansive and 
aggressive assertions of executive 
authority,” Kavanaugh wrote in a recent D.C. 
Circuit ruling. His concern makes him a 
fitting successor to Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, who, in one of his final opinions, 
urged the Supreme Court to “reconsider” the 
premises underlying Chevron’s “reflexive 
deference” to unelected bureaucrats. 
 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s first nominee, 
has argued that excessive deference to 
agencies replaces “an independent 
decisionmaker seeking to declare the law’s 
meaning as fairly as possible” (i.e., a judge) 
with “an avowedly politicized administrative 
agent seeking to pursue whatever policy 
whim may rule the day.” 
 
Chief Justice John Roberts has similarly 
raised an alarm about the concentration of 
power in administrative agencies and the lack 
of meaningful checks and balances. “The 
danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state,” the chief justice has 
cautioned, “cannot be dismissed.” 
 
“We seem to be straying further and further 
from the Constitution without so much as 
pausing to ask why,” Justice Clarence 
Thomas has separately observed. 
 
The fundamental principles underlying our 
Constitution are that government power must 
be divided up, rather than concentrated, and 
those who exercise it must be accountable to 
the people. It’s difficult to imagine a greater 
departure from these principles than the 
concentration of near-limitless power in the 
hands of unelected bureaucrats, combined 
with a lack of oversight from Congress and 
the courts. 
 
With three sitting justices raising questions 
about Chevron deference and another on 
deck, it’s time for the Supreme Court to 
address the issue head-on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  416 
 
 
“The End of DACA Is the Next Big Immigration Fight” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Noah Feldman 
 
August 9, 2018 
 
The struggle over the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program and the fate of 
the immigrants known as “Dreamers” is 
heating up again. There’s a strong probability 
that it will go all the way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and fast — conceivably even before 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh gets a Senate vote on 
his confirmation. 
 
The path to the Supreme Court passes 
through the possibility of dueling nationwide 
lower-court injunctions. There are already 
orders mandating that President Donald 
Trump’s administration keep in place 
DACA, which shields from deportation 
certain undocumented immigrants who came 
to the U.S. as children. A federal district court 
in Texas could soon issue a contradictory 
order shutting it down. 
 
That seems likely, because it’s the same 
judge who in 2015 blocked Barack Obama’s 
administration from implementing the 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents policy, or 
DAPA, which would have extended the 
DACA protections to Dreamers’ parents. 
 
To understand the looming crisis, you have to 
start with the rather remarkable fact that 
DACA is still legally in place, even though 
the Trump administration ordered it shut 
down in September 2017. The reason that’s 
so remarkable is that DACA isn’t a law 
passed by Congress. It’s a unilateral 
presidential enactment adopted by Obama. 
 
Ordinarily, what one president can do by fiat, 
another can undo by fiat. But in January, a 
federal judge in California ruled that the 
Trump administration had acted arbitrarily 
when it shut down the program. He ordered 
that DACA remain in place. Since then, a 
couple of other federal district courts agreed. 
 
My own view is that these courts got it 
wrong. But Cass Sunstein, my colleague at 
Bloomberg Opinion and Harvard Law School 
and (among many other things) the leading 
administrative law scholar in the 
country, thinks the decision keeping DACA 
alive was “eminently reasonable.” I won’t 
bore you with the disagreement, which 
centers on whether the Trump administration 
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gave a good enough reason for shutting the 
program down when it asserted that DACA 
was illegal. 
 
What matters practically is that the courts’ 
orders kept DACA going despite Trump’s 
wishes. 
 
That led directly to a new federal lawsuit, 
filed by Texas and seven other states, arguing 
that DACA is in fact unlawful, because it 
exceeded Obama’s presidential authority. A 
hearing the case took place Wednesday. 
 
It’s pure luck, but the judge who drew the 
case, Andrew Hanen, is the same judge who 
struck down DAPA. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld his opinion 
in that case. And the U.S. Supreme Court 
then split 4-4 after Justice Antonin Scalia 
died, leaving the appeals court ruling in 
effect. There can be little doubt that Scalia 
would have voted to strike down DAPA. 
 
As a matter of constitutional logic, if the 
program for parents was beyond Obama’s 
presidential authority, so was the program for 
their children. And Hanen has already 
demonstrated his willingness to issue a 
nationwide injunction enforcing his ruling. 
So it’s a pretty safe bet that Hanen will at 
some point rule DACA unconstitutional. 
 
That leaves the question of timing — which 
could be all important here. 
 
DACA supporters are arguing to Hanen that 
unlike DAPA, which had not yet been 
implemented when Hanen blocked it, DACA 
has been in place for several years. Therefore, 
they maintain, there is no immediate need for 
a preliminary injunction because the states 
are suffering no irreparable harm from 
continuing the program. 
 
I’m skeptical that Hanen will embrace that 
distinction. He previously ruled that state 
resources expended on DAPA were harmful 
enough to issue his injunction. States are also 
spending resources on DACA. 
If and when Hanen strikes down DACA and 
orders a nationwide injunction against it, the 
Trump administration will be whipsawed 
between competing court orders. Some 
courts are ordering it to keep DACA going, 
and Hanen would be ordering the opposite. 
 
In the face of contradictory orders, the 
administration would seek expedited review 
by courts of appeals. If those didn’t create 
uniformity immediately — and that is the 
most likely outcome — then it would turn to 
the Supreme Court. After all, the high court’s 
job is to ensure some modicum of legal 
uniformity across the country. 
 
All that could happen within days or even 
hours of a ruling and injunction by Hanen. 
And Hanen could perfectly well rule at any 
time. He’s already thought through the 
constitutional issues in issuing his DAPA 
opinion. 
 
Nevertheless, Hanen can use his discretion to 
choose when he wants to issue a decision and 
an injunction. And he has a pragmatic reason 
to take his time. 
 
That’s because the Supreme Court is evenly 
split again, as it was when it voted on the 5th 
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Circuit decision upholding Hanen’s DAPA 
ruling. 
 
If the current Supreme Court had to consider 
dueling nationwide injunctions, it could face 
a serious crisis if i again divided 4-4. A split 
court can only uphold the decision on appeal 
before it. If a 5th Circuit decision upholding 
a Hanen opinion remained in place, it would 
put the Trump administration into a legally 
untenable situation. 
 
Of course, moderates like Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Elena Kagan could hammer out a temporary 
compromise. But such a compromise would 
almost certainly have to include keeping 
DACA in place. 
 
So it makes sense for Hanen to wait until 
Kavanaugh is confirmed, and then issue his 
ruling. 
 
If that’s what happens, Kavanaugh may have 
to swing into action pretty darn fast. He 
would face his first controversial, emergency 
vote in a high-profile case where his vote 
would be decisive. 
 
It won’t be his last.
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“Judge Upholds Order for Trump Administration to Restore DACA” 
 
 
New York Times 
 
Miriam Jordan 
 
August 3, 2018 
 
A federal judge on Friday upheld his 
previous order to revive an Obama-era 
program that shields some 700,000 young 
immigrants from deportation, saying that the 
Trump administration had failed to justify 
eliminating it. 
Judge John D. Bates of the Federal District 
Court for the District of Columbia gave the 
government 20 days to appeal his decision. 
But his ruling could conflict with another 
decision on the program that a federal judge 
in Texas is expected to issue as early as next 
week. 
The Trump administration announced late 
last year that it would phase out the program 
known as Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, or DACA, which protects 
undocumented young adults from 
deportation and grants them two-year 
renewable work permits. The administration 
argued that President Barack Obama had 
overstepped his authority and circumvented 
Congress when he created the program in 
2012. 
The decision to end the program has faced 
numerous legal challenges. Currently, the 
government must continue accepting 
applications to renew DACA status, if not 
new applications from those who meet the 
criteria to qualify. DACA recipients — often 
called “Dreamers” — typically were brought 
to the United States illegally as children 
through no choice of their own. 
Judge Bates ruled in late April that the 
administration must restore the DACA 
program and accept new applications. He had 
stayed his decision for 90 days to give the 
Department of Homeland Security, which 
runs the program, the opportunity to lay out 
its reasons for ending it. 
Kirstjen Nielsen, the homeland security 
secretary, responded last month, arguing that 
DACA would likely be found 
unconstitutional in the Texas case and 
therefore must end. She relied heavily on the 
memorandum that her predecessor, Elaine C. 
Duke, had issued to rescind the program and 
said that the department had the discretion to 
end the program, just as the department under 
Mr. Obama had exercised discretion to create 
it. 
Judge Bates, who was appointed by President 
George W. Bush, did not agree. He called the 
shutdown of the program “arbitrary and 
capricious” and said that Secretary Nielsen’s 
response “fails to elaborate meaningfully on 
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the agency’s primary rationale for its 
decision.” 
Two federal judges, in Brooklyn and in San 
Francisco, issued injunctions this year 
ordering the government to keep the 
program. But neither of those rulings 
required that the government accept new 
applications, as the ruling by Judge Bates 
does. The earlier decisions are pending 
before appeals courts. 
Meanwhile, the State of Texas and several 
other plaintiffs have sued the government to 
rescind the program, contending that it is 
illegal. 
The District of Columbia lawsuit was 
brought by the N.A.A.C.P., Microsoft and 
Princeton University. The DACA program 
has broad bipartisan support in the business 
and academic worlds. 
Christopher L. Eisgruber, the president of 
Princeton, hailed the court’s decision. 
“Princeton University’s continued success as 
a world-class institution of learning and 
research depends on our ability to attract 
talent from all backgrounds, including 
Dreamers,” he said. Brad Smith, the president 
of Microsoft, said that finding a solution for 
DACA “has become an economic imperative 
and a humanitarian necessity.” 
Since the 2016 presidential campaign, the 
young people who benefited from DACA 
have seen their hopes alternately elevated and 
dashed, sometimes in the space of a week. 
Neither a flurry of court decisions nor horse-
trading in Congress has settled the issue. 
In a statement on Friday, United We Dream, 
an organization that represents Dreamers, 
offered a sobering assessment: “The situation 
for DACA beneficiaries remains dangerous 
and unstable, as we do not know how the 
administration will respond, and there are 
other court cases in progress.” 
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“Kavanaugh Could Stymie Trump’s Immigration Policies” 
 
 
Bloomberg Law 
Laura D. Francis 
 
July 10, 2018 
 
President Donald Trump’s nomination of 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh to replace Justice 
Anthony Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme 
Court isn’t necessarily a guaranteed win for 
the president’s immigration policies. 
The Trump administration already is facing a 
host of lawsuits on a variety of immigration 
issues: ending the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program and temporary 
protected status, state and local “sanctuary” 
policies on whether to cooperate with federal 
immigration enforcement, and some 
challenges to limits on business visas. 
Kavanaugh hasn’t addressed many 
immigration cases while on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
But he’s likely to face at least some if 
confirmed to replace Kennedy. 
“We’re going to see a lot more business 
immigration litigation because of the 
unreasonably restrictive decisions” from U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, David 
Leopold of Ulmer & Berne in Cleveland, 
Ohio, told Bloomberg Law July 10. 
Some of those cases may make their way up 
to the Supreme Court. 
‘Question Mark’ on Immigration 
But “the conservative tilt to the court 
becomes a big question mark when it comes 
to immigration” because many of the cases 
involve a “strict” interpretation of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, he said. 
That means conservative justices could go 
against the Trump administration’s 
interpretations of the INA, he said. 
The Supreme Court “has given Congress 
plenary authority to write the immigration 
law,” said Leopold, a past president and past 
general counsel of the American Immigration 
Lawyers Association. So it’s possible that 
Kavanaugh and the other justices will “hold 
the Trump administration to the letter of the 
law” when it comes to the INA’s provisions 
on employment visas, he said. 
Kavanaugh is “very much a careful jurist who 
looks at the statute and looks at the regulation 
and tries to determine whether the executive 
branch’s regulation is consistent with the 
statute,” said Kevin R. Johnson, dean of the 
University of California, Davis, School of 
Law. 
“He’s going to call it as he sees it,” Johnson 
told Bloomberg Law July 10. “I don’t think 
he’s going to allow the executive branch to 
go beyond what he views as the requirements 
of the statute,” he said. 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act “is 
clear on what constitutes a specialty 
occupation,” the type of job covered by the 
H-1B guestworker visa, Leopold said. 
Instead of following that law, the 
administration is “making it up as they go 
along,” he said. 
“Brett Kavanaugh is a superb choice to fill 
the current vacancy in the U.S. Supreme 
Court,” Federation for American 
Immigration Reform President Dan Stein 
said in a July 10 statement. “President Trump 
should be commended for choosing a 
candidate who clearly understands the 
nation’s patchwork of immigration laws and 
how they are intended to protect both 
American workers and the overarching 
national interest,” he said. 
FAIR advocates for lower immigration 
levels. 
Pro-DACA? 
“With important immigration-related 
decisions heading to the Supreme Court—
including the challenge to the Obama-era 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA)—Judge Kavanaugh will provide 
expert insight into the legality of the program 
and the ability of future administrations to 
circumvent Congress and create tailored 
amnesty programs for large groups of illegal 
aliens,” Stein said. 
But Kavanaugh’s views of the executive’s 
authority may in fact result in a ruling in 
favor of DACA. 
In a 2013 decision involving nuclear waste 
storage, Kavanaugh took an expansive view 
of the president’s power not to enforce the 
law. 
The president “possesses a significant degree 
of prosecutorial discretion not to take 
enforcement actions against violators of a 
federal law,” he wrote. In fact, because of 
separation of powers concerns, “Congress 
may not mandate that the President prosecute 
a certain kind of offense or offender,” 
Kavanaugh said. 
Johnson said it’s “very hard to tell” how 
Kavanaugh would rule on the DACA issues. 
Considering that the Supreme Court tied 4-4 
when it considered the challenge to the 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents program, 
Kavanaugh could very well be the swing vote 
one way or another, he said. 
“The first question that comes to mind is 
where is he going to be on prosecutorial 
discretion,” Leopold said. Kavanaugh’s 
viewpoint in this area doesn’t just affect 
DACA, it “affects business immigration as 
well,” he said. 
‘Tremendous Discretion’ 
The Immigration and Nationality Act gives 
“tremendous discretion to the executive,” 
Leopold said. 
That was the view of the sitting justices in the 
recent case involving the president’s travel 
ban, which turned on the president’s 
authority under the INA to block the entry of 
certain immigrants. 
“The court has a long history of deferring to 
the executive” when “it comes to national 
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security,” Leopold said. It’s possible that the 
justices may rule differently on immigration 
law questions involving employment, he 
said. 
Johnson agreed, especially when it comes to 
Kavanaugh. “He might be more deferential to 
the executive” in a case involving national 
security than in a “run-of-the-mill” 
immigration case, Johnson said. 
Leopold said he thinks “the real challenge for 
the justices” is “to set aside their political 
opinions and not to permit politics into the 
courtroom.” 
“The hope is we have intellectual honesty,” 
he said. 
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“Judge’s Ruling Isn’t Going to Save the Dreamers” 
 
 
Bloomberg 
Noah Feldman 
 
January 10, 2018 
 
A federal judge in California on 
Tuesday blocked President Donald 
Trump from rescinding the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals program, which he 
had planned to phase out in March. The 
impulse to protect the so-called Dreamers is 
admirable. But legally speaking, the opinion 
can’t be correct. If President Barack Obama 
had the legal authority to use his discretion to 
create DACA in the first place -- itself a close 
legal question -- Trump must have the legal 
authority to reverse DACA on the ground that 
he considers it to have exceeded Obama’s 
powers. 
 
District Judge William H. Alsup’s ruling was 
based on a provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act that says executive agency 
actions must not be arbitrary and capricious. 
The court held that it was arbitrary for 
Trump’s Department of Homeland Security 
to rescind DACA. It reasoned that because 
DACA was legal, Homeland Security could 
not rescind it for being illegal. 
 
This logic may sound plausible. But it runs 
into multiple legal problems. 
 
The first has to do with applying the arbitrary 
and capricious standard to DACA in the first 
place. The Administrative Procedure Act 
functions so that the courts can supervise 
executive agencies and be sure their actions 
are based on reasoned policy logic. But 
the law makes an exception for any decision 
that is “committed to agency discretion by 
law.” 
 
The original DACA order was based on the 
president’s discretionary authority to decide 
how to enforce federal immigration law. 
Recall that Dreamers have no statutory right 
to be in the country -- they are the children of 
undocumented immigrants. DACA was, 
formally speaking, an announced 
discretionary decision by the executive 
branch not to deport Dreamers. 
 
In court, the Trump administration argued 
that if DACA was itself an exercise of 
discretion, the decision to revoke DACA 
must similarly be an exercise of discretion 
and not subject to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. In other 
words, the courts have no business telling the 
president that he cannot reverse a 
discretionary decision by a previous 
president. 
 
The federal judge rejected this argument by 
saying that while the decision not to deport 
was indeed discretionary and not subject to 
review, the decision to deport was not 
discretionary in the same way. It added that 
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there was further reason to review Homeland 
Security’s move because DACA had invited 
Dreamers “out of the shadows” and reversing 
the program would subject them to 
consequences that would infringe on the 
liberty and property interests created by the 
original order. 
 
There’s something appealing about this 
argument. Certainly prosecuting or deporting 
someone is active in the way that deciding not 
to do so is not. Yet it’s difficult to accept that 
once the government decides not to prosecute 
or deport someone, it must then justify the 
decision to change its mind. The asymmetry 
isn’t especially consistent with general 
principles of administrative law. 
 
The second significant legal problem with the 
California court’s decision is its assertion that 
it was arbitrary and capricious for Homeland 
Security to rescind DACA.  
 
The main basis the government gave for 
ending DACA was that it was illegal when 
Obama enacted in the first place -- it 
exceeded his constitutional authority. This 
was essentially the view taken by the federal 
district court in Texas that froze the Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans plan that 
was DACA’s twin sibling, allowing the 
undocumented parents of citizen children to 
stay in the country. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit agreed. The U.S. 
Supreme Court split 4-4 on the issue after 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death and before 
Trump named Justice Neil Gorsuch to the 
court. 
 
The federal district court in California 
disagreed. It said that DACA was legal in the 
first place, and that the Supreme Court never 
said otherwise. It concluded that ending 
DACA “was based on the flawed legal 
premise that the agency lacked authority to 
implement DACA.” And it rejected the 
notion that it was up to the executive branch 
to decide whether to defend DACA in court, 
especially in the 5th Circuit where it is 
arguably illegal under the precedent of the 
DAPA program. 
 
This analysis cannot be correct. One 
presidential administration is entitled to 
disagree with the legal analysis of another. 
 
What’s more, the president has the right to 
interpret the Constitution when it comes to 
the legality of his own actions. He doesn’t 
have to wait for a court to tell him something 
is illegal. He can judge for himself. 
 
And the legal judgment that DACA exceeds 
presidential authority certainly isn’t arbitrary 
or capricious. A federal court of appeals and 
four Supreme Court justices have already 
said DAPA was. If it weren’t for Scalia’s 
death, it’s highly probable that the majority 
of the justices would have taken that view. 
And it seems even more likely that Gorsuch 
would now provide the deciding fifth vote to 
say DACA is unconstitutional. 
 
Trump’s Department of Homeland Security 
can’t have been acting arbitrarily because its 
judgment aligns with these authorities. 
 
The California judge cited Trump’s pro-
DACA tweets as evidence that continuing the 
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program serves the public interest. That’s 
cute, but misleading. Trump is calling for 
congressional legislation to continue DACA, 
not for executive action. 
 
I deeply hope some version of DACA is 
signed into law. But this judicial decision 
isn’t going to save the Dreamers, no matter 
how well-intentioned it might be. 
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“A Judge Supports Dreamers and the Rule of Law” 
 
Bloomberg 
Cass R. Sunstein 
 
January 16, 2018 
 
The White House was quick to condemn a 
federal judge’s decision last week striking 
down the Trump administration’s efforts to 
terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program. It called the ruling 
“outrageous,” and President Donald Trump 
tweeted that it shows “how broken and unfair 
our court system is.”  
 
But the judge’s decision to invalidate the 
program’s termination, and thus to protect 
young immigrants who were brought to the 
U.S. illegally as children, was not 
outrageous. Strictly as a matter of law, it was 
eminently reasonable — whatever Congress 
does or does not do in the coming days and 
weeks. 
 
To begin to understand why, imagine that in 
2021, a Democratic president — say, Bernie 
Sanders — starts repealing dozens of 
regulations issued during the Trump 
administration, on the ground that the new 
attorney general believes those regulations 
are “illegal.” 
 
Though Democrats might celebrate, that’s a 
horrible idea. The executive branch can’t 
simply assert that the decisions of its 
predecessor were “illegal.” It has to justify 
that conclusion. If it isn’t able to do that, it 
must come up with better grounds for 
changing course. 
 
In a nutshell, that’s what Judge William 
Alsup told the Trump administration last 
week in his DACA decision. 
 
As the judge explained, “DACA grew out of 
a long agency history of discretionary relief 
programs,” going back to the Dwight 
Eisenhower administration and including 
major initiatives under Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Such 
“programs had become a well-accepted 
feature of the executive’s enforcement of our 
immigration laws, recognized as such by 
Congress and the Supreme Court,” Alsup 
wrote. 
 
When it adopted the current DACA program 
in 2012, the Barack Obama administration 
said that the young people seeking to qualify 
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for its protections had to meet certain 
criteria. They had to have come to the U.S. 
before the age of 16, and they had to have 
resided continuously in the country for at 
least five years. They also had to have been 
enrolled in school, and graduated from high 
school or obtained a GED, or been honorably 
discharged from the U.S. military or Coast 
Guard. And they could not pose a threat to 
national security or public safety. More than 
650,000 young people residing in the U.S. 
meet these standards. 
 
Those who qualify under the DACA program 
are not to be detained or removed for two 
years from the time that they successfully 
apply for its protections (unless they do 
something wrong). They can also obtain 
Social Security numbers and receive 
authorization to work. 
 
In September 2017, Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions wrote a short letter to the acting 
secretary of Homeland Security, stating that 
the program was an “unconstitutional 
exercise of authority by the Executive 
Branch.” Because it offered no serious 
analysis of why that was the case, 
the letter was a shoddy document from a 
legal point of view. But the next day, Acting 
Secretary Elaine Duke, referring to the letter, 
rescinded DACA. 
 
In invalidating this rescission, Judge Alsup 
applied a well-established principle, widely 
ignored even by expert commentators: An 
agency’s action must be upheld or 
invalidated only on the basis of the specific 
reasons the agency itself has given. So the 
only question was whether the attorney 
general was right to conclude that DACA was 
illegal. 
 
The judge thought not. He said that “each 
feature of the DACA program is anchored in 
authority granted or recognized by Congress 
or the Supreme Court.” In his view, the 
executive branch is perfectly entitled to 
conclude that DACA enrollees are low-
priority cases for removal and to direct its 
enforcement priorities elsewhere. 
 
The Trump administration’s strongest 
response pointed to a 2014 appeals court 
ruling, striking down a related Obama 
administration program that protected the 
parents of lawful permanent residents from 
deportation. If that program is invalid, it 
could be argued that DACA is invalid, too. 
 
That’s not a crazy argument. But as Judge 
Alsup emphasized, the DACA program is 
quite different. Focusing specifically on 
children, it is more limited than the program 
covering immigrant parents, and it builds 
more incrementally on longstanding 
practices; it stands on firmer legal ground. 
 
Importantly, the judge did not rule out the 
possibility that in the future the Trump 
administration might be able to defend a 
decision to rescind the program. Agencies are 
perfectly entitled to change course, so long as 
they offer a reasoned explanation for doing 
so. 
 
Perhaps the government could explain that 
the program does not fit with the Trump 
administration’s overall immigration 
strategy, because the protection it affords is 
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too broad and categorical. The problem is 
that it never made that argument. 
 
A broader principle is at stake. A central 
distinction between authoritarian and non-
authoritarian systems is that in the latter, 
executive officials have an obligation to obey 
the law. An equally central distinction is that 
officials must give reasons for their 
decisions. 
 
They cannot simply assert their power or 
their will. In insisting on reason-giving, 
Judge Alsup’s ruling keeps faith with the best 
traditions of our legal system — and the rule 
of law.  
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“Full appeals court to hear case on injunction against Trump sanctuary policies” 
 
 
Politico 
Josh Gerstein 
June 4, 2018 
 
The full bench of the federal appeals court 
based in Chicago has agreed to consider 
whether a District Court judge went too far in 
imposing a nationwide ban against 
enforcement of Trump administration 
policies seeking to block so-called sanctuary 
cities from receiving Justice Department 
grants.  
 
In April, a three-judge panel of the 7th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
nationwide inunction that the city of Chicago 
obtained against the policy. However, one 
judge, Daniel Manion, said he would have 
narrowed the injunction to protect only 
Chicago.  
 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who has 
railed against nationwide injunctions as a 
power grab by the judiciary, asked the entire 
bench of the 7th Circuit to rein in the 
injunction. On Monday, the court said in an 
order that a majority of its active judges had 
voted to consider doing just that.  
 
The en banc court could consist of as many 
as 13 judges: the court’s 11 active judges plus 
the two senior judges on the original ruling. 
The overall set of judges leans heavily in the 
Republican direction, with 11 GOP 
appointees and two Democratic appointees.  
 
There is no reason to expect the judges will 
vote along party lines, however. All three 
judges who voted earlier this year to uphold 
the ruling in Chicago’s favor, including the 
one who said he would narrow it, are 
Republican appointees. 
 
The April ruling rejected efforts by the 
Justice Department to impose new grant 
conditions requiring that cities, counties and 
states cooperate with immigration 
enforcement efforts in order to get so-called 
Byrne Justice Assistance Grants. 
 
In a strongly worded opinion, Judge Ilana 
Rovner said that allowing federal agencies to 
add conditions to grant funds without explicit 
congressional authority could lead toward 
“tyranny.”  
 
“The Attorney General in this case used the 
sword of federal funding to conscript state 
and local authorities to aid in federal civil 
immigration enforcement,” Rovner wrote, in 
an opinion joined by Judge William Bauer. 
“But the power of the purse rests with 
Congress, which authorized the federal funds 
at issue and did not impose any immigration 
enforcement conditions on the receipt of such 
funds. It falls to us, the judiciary, as the 
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remaining branch of the government, to act as 
a check on such usurpation of power.” 
The narrower dispute going before the full 
bench of the 7th Circuit will solely involve 
whether U.S. District Court Judge Harry 
Leinenweber, based in Chicago, was right to 
apply his ruling nationwide, even though the 
city was the only plaintiff in the suit before 
him. 
 
In a speech last year, Sessions slammed what 
he called the “activist” practice of judges 
issuing nationwide injunctions purporting to 
bind federal officials across the country and 
sometimes around the globe. 
 
“Forgive me for feeling strongly about this,” 
the attorney general said at the time. “Today, 
more and more judges are issuing nationwide 
injunctions and in effect single judges … are 
making themselves superlegislators for the 
entire United States. … A single judge’s 
decision can enjoin the entire federal 
government from acting. It’s an extreme step. 
Too often, district court judges are doing it 
without following the law.” 
 
Sessions has repeatedly complained that the 
Trump administration has been swamped 
with such injunctions, but he has 
acknowledged that they began to pick up 
under President Barack Obama. At least one 
such order, a Texas federal judge’s 2015 
injunction blocking Obama’s expansion of 
protection for certain illegal immigrants, won 
praise from Sessions while he was a senator. 
However, it’s unclear whether he ever 
explicitly endorsed the nationwide element of 
the ruling. 
 
Judges and activists on the right and left have 
defended the nationwide injunction practice 
as appropriate in at least some cases, in order 
to prevent disparate treatment in different 
parts of the country, particularly in 
immigration-related cases. 
 
The Supreme Court has never issued a 
detailed opinion on the validity of nationwide 
injunctions, but one expert said there was 
some chance the grant-related dispute could 
wind up getting the justices to square up to 
the issue. 
 
“If the Supreme Court does not reach the 
scope of the injunction in the travel ban case, 
this is the most likely vehicle for the question 
to reach the Court,” UCLA law professor 
Sam Bray said in an email, referring to the 
president’s disputed executive order banning 
entry into the United States by nationals of 
several countries, most of them majority-
Muslim. “The Seventh Circuit’s decision to 
rehear en banc suggests growing judicial 
concern about national injunctions.” 
 
Even if the 7th Circuit lifts the nationwide 
injunction in the case about grants to cities 
with sanctuary policies, the Trump 
administration policies may still not take 
effect. That’s because another federal judge, 
based in San Francisco, also blocked the 
policies nationwide. His order is on appeal to 
the 9th Circuit.
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“Sanctuary cities as the next nationwide injunction test case” 
 
 
SCOTUS Blog 
Steve Vladeck 
 
June 19, 2018 
 
However the Supreme Court decides the 
travel ban case in the next 10 days, it may 
well avoid taking a position on one of the 
numerous issues raised in that litigation — 
whether the district court in Trump v. 
Hawaii lacked the authority to issue a 
nationwide injunction. But the justices may 
not be able to duck the broader debate over 
the propriety of nationwide injunctions for 
much longer, thanks to an unusual 
application for a “partial” stay filed by 
Solicitor General Noel Francisco on Monday 
in Sessions v. City of Chicago. 
The City of Chicago case is one of several 
pending challenges to actions taken by 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions under 
Executive Order 13,768, which provides that 
certain “sanctuary jurisdictions” that refused 
to comply with some immigration 
enforcement measures would not be “eligible 
to receive Federal grants, except as deemed 
necessary for law enforcement purposes” by 
the attorney general or secretary of 
Homeland Security. As relevant here, the city 
of Chicago sued challenging conditions that 
the attorney general subsequently imposed 
under the executive order on receipt of funds 
under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Program, claiming that they 
were both unlawful and unconstitutional. 
 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois agreed with the city with 
respect to two of the three challenged 
conditions — the “notice” condition, which 
requires advance notice to federal authorities 
of the release date of persons in state or local 
custody who are believed to be noncitizens, 
and the “access” condition, which requires 
local correctional facilities to provide access 
to federal agents to meet with those persons. 
Both of those conditions, the district court 
ruled, could not be traced to any statutory 
authority, and therefore exceeded the 
attorney general’s authority to impose 
unilaterally. And because of considerations 
the district court deemed unique to 
immigration law, not only did Judge Harry 
Leinenweber enjoin the attorney general 
from continued enforcement of the 
conditions against the city of Chicago, but he 
issued the injunction on a nationwide basis. 
 
After refusing to stay the injunction pending 
appeal, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed in 
April 2018, unanimously concluding that no 
statute granted the attorney general the 
authority to impose the “notice” and “access” 
conditions. As for the nationwide scope of 
the district court’s injunction, a majority of 
the 7th Circuit panel stressed that 
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“nationwide injunctions should be utilized 
only in rare circumstances,” but concluded 
that the city’s suit was one such 
circumstance, because “[t]he case presents 
essentially a facial challenge to a policy 
applied nationwide, the balance of equities 
favors nationwide relief, and the format of the 
Byrne JAG grant itself renders individual 
relief ineffective to provide full relief.” Judge 
Daniel Manion dissented only with respect to 
the nationwide nature of the injunction. As he 
wrote, “Other jurisdictions that do not want 
to comply with the Notice and Access 
conditions were not parties to this suit, and 
there is no need to protect them in order to 
protect Chicago.” 
 
The government sought en banc rehearing of 
the panel decision only with respect to the 
nationwide scope of the injunction, and a stay 
of that aspect of the injunction (but not the 
injunction itself) pending disposition of its 
petition. On June 4, the 7th Circuit granted 
rehearing en banc “only as to the geographic 
scope of the preliminary injunction entered 
by the district court,” but deferred the 
government’s request for a ruling on its 
application for a stay until the Supreme Court 
decided the travel ban case, which “may 
facilitate our disposition of the pending 
motions.” 
Given the full 7th Circuit’s refusal to rule 
immediately on the stay application, the 
solicitor general on Monday filed an 
application for a partial stay directly with 
Justice Elena Kagan, in her capacity as 
Circuit Justice for the 7th Circuit. The 
application asks Kagan to stay the nationwide 
scope of the district court’s injunction 
pending the en banc 7th Circuit’s disposition 
of the government’s petition for rehearing — 
which looks like it will be argued later this 
summer — and, “if necessary, pending the 
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari and further proceedings in this 
Court.” Later on Monday, Kagan ordered a 
response to the application — by 5:00 p.m. 
on Wednesday, June 27 (by which point the 
Supreme Court may well have decided the 
travel-ban case). 
 
Thus, although the government is not 
challenging the substance of the district 
court’s injunction, it appears willing to use 
that injunction as a vehicle to challenge the 
propriety of nationwide injunctions more 
generally — perhaps more so than in the 
travel ban or DACA litigation. Whether the 
justices are interested in such a challenge 
(especially in a case in which the government 
may be all-but conceding the weakness of its 
position on the merits) remains to be seen. 
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“Judge: Trump overstepped in sanctuary city order” 
 
 
Boston Herald 
Kimberly Atkins 
 
August 2, 2018 
 
The battle between the Trump administration 
and so-called “sanctuary cities” appears 
bound for the U.S. Supreme Court after a 
federal appeals court declared 
unconstitutional the president’s executive 
order stripping funding from localities that 
don’t cooperate with federal immigration 
authorities. 
The ruling was a mixed bag for the Trump 
administration, striking down the order while 
also lifting the nationwide ban against its 
implementation. 
But 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Sidney R. Thomas held in the 2-1 ruling that 
Trump overstepped his constitutional 
authority, reasoning that only Congress has 
the power to grant or deny funding — a 
power the president cannot circumvent. 
“Here, the Administration has not even 
attempted to show that Congress authorized 
it to withdraw federal grant moneys from 
jurisdictions that do not agree with the 
current Administration’s immigration 
strategies,” Thomas wrote. “Nor could it. In 
fact, Congress has frequently considered and 
thus far rejected legislation accomplishing 
the goals of the Executive Order.” 
Other cases out of Philadelphia and Chicago 
are also making their way through the courts 
and are likely bound for the U.S. Supreme 
Court — particularly if any appellate court 
rules in the administration’s favor, creating a 
circuit split. 
Opponents of the order declared victory, as 
supporters said it still leaves the door open for 
Congress and the White House to take other 
steps to press states and local governments to 
cooperate with federal immigration 
authorities. 
“Put simply, the president cannot use the 
threat of defunding as a weapon to force local 
governments to abandon politics that make 
their communities safer,” said Santa Clara 
County, Calif., Counsel James R. Williams. 
Jessica M. Vaughan of the Center for 
Immigration Studies, which supports 
Trump’s order, said that it was good policy 
regardless of the court’s constitutional 
reasoning — and said other courts, including 
the Supreme Court, could see it differently. 
“What would be better is for Congress to 
clarify,” Vaughan said. “But Congress can’t 
get out of its own way on anything, especially 
immigration-related matters.” 
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The vacancy on the high court, left by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s retirement this week, 
could delay a move by the justices to take up 
the case to avoid a potential 4-4 deadlock. 
Trump’s nominee to replace Kennedy, Judge 
Brett Kavanaugh, likely won’t go before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee for a hearing 
until September, committee chairman Chuck 
Grassley (R-Iowa) said yesterday. That 
would put a vote on his confirmation some 
time in October — after the court’s new term 
has already commenced. 
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“Trump administration won’t defend ACA in case brought by GOP states” 
 
 
The Washington Post 
 
Amy Goldstein 
 
June 7, 2018 
 
The Trump administration said Thursday 
night that it will not defend the Affordable 
Care Act against the latest legal challenge to 
its constitutionality — a dramatic break from 
the executive branch’s tradition of arguing to 
uphold existing statutes and a land mine for 
health insurance changes the ACA brought 
about. 
 
In a brief filed in a Texas federal court and an 
accompanying letter to the House and Senate 
leaders of both parties, the Justice 
Department agrees in large part with the 20 
Republican-led states that brought the suit. 
They contend that the ACA provision 
requiring most Americans to carry health 
insurance soon will no longer be 
constitutional and that, as a result, consumer 
insurance protections under the law will not 
be valid, either. 
 
The three-page letter from Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions begins by saying that Justice 
adopted its position “with the approval of the 
President of the United States.” The letter 
acknowledges that the decision not to defend 
an existing law deviates from history but 
contends that it is not unprecedented. 
 
The bold swipe at the ACA, a Republican 
whipping post since its 2010 passage, does 
not immediately affect any of its provisions. 
But it puts the law on far more wobbly legal 
footing in the case, which is being heard by a 
GOP-appointed judge who has in other recent 
cases ruled against more minor aspects. 
 
The administration does not go as far as the 
Texas attorney general and his counterparts. 
In their suit, lodged in February in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, they argue that the entire law is now 
invalid.  
 
By contrast, the Justice brief and letter say 
many other aspects of the law can survive 
because they can be considered legally 
distinct from the insurance mandate and such 
consumer protections as a ban on charging 
more or refusing coverage to people with 
preexisting medical conditions. 
A group of 17 Democratic-led states that 
have won standing in the case also filed a 
brief on Thursday night arguing for the 
ACA’s preservation. 
While the case has to play out from here, the 
administration’s striking position raises the 
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possibility that major parts of the law could 
be struck down — a year after the Republican 
Congress failed at attempts to repeal core 
provisions. 
 
In an unusual filing just before 6 p.m. 
Thursday, when the brief was due, the three 
career Justice attorneys involved in the case 
— Joel McElvain, Eric Beckenhauer and 
Rebecca Kopplin — withdrew. 
 
The department’s argument, if adopted by 
U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor, “would 
be breathtaking in its effect,’ said Timothy 
Jost, a retired Washington and Lee law 
professor who follows such litigation closely. 
“Of all of the actions the Trump 
administration has taken to undermine 
individual insurance markets, this may be the 
most destabilizing. . . . [If] I’m an insurer, I 
don’t know what I am supposed to do or not.” 
 
Jost, an ACA supporter, noted that the 
administration’s decision not to defend the 
law comes during the season when 
participating insurers must file their rates for 
next year with state regulators. It raises new 
questions about whether insurers still will be 
required to charge the same prices to all 
customers, healthy or sick. 
 
And Topher Spiro, vice president of health 
policy at the liberal Center for American 
Progress, said the administration’s legal 
argument contradicts promises by Trump that 
he would not tamper with the ACA’s 
protections for people with preexisting 
medical conditions. 
 
University of Michigan law professor 
Nicholas Bagley, another ACA defender, 
went even further in a blog post. “If the 
Justice Department can just throw in the 
towel whenever a law is challenged in court, 
it can effectively pick and choose which laws 
should remain on the books,” he wrote. 
“That’s not a rule of law I recognize. That’s 
a rule by whim. And it scares me.” 
 
Crusading against the ACA has been a 
priority of Trump’s since his campaign for 
the White House. On his first night in office, 
Trump issued an executive order, directing 
federal agencies to lighten the regulatory 
burden placed by the law. Last October, the 
president unilaterally ended a significant part 
of the law that cushions insurers financially 
from an obligation to give discounts to 
decrease out-of-pocket costs to lower-income 
customers with ACA coverage.  
 
More recently, the White House and 
Department of Health and Human Services 
have been working to make it easier for 
consumers to buy relatively inexpensive 
health plans that exclude some of the benefits 
the ACA requires. 
 
The new challenge comes six years after the 
Supreme Court’s divided ruling that the ACA 
is constitutional. That ruling hinged on the 
reasoning that, while the government “does 
not have the power to order people to buy 
health insurance,” as Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. wrote for the majority, it “does 
have the power to impose a tax on those 
without health insurance.” 
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The case in Texas, which has attracted 
relatively little notice until now, emerges 
from the massive tax bill Congress passed 
late last year. In that, lawmakers decided to 
eliminate the tax penalty the ACA requires 
people to pay if they flout the insurance 
mandate. The enforcement of that 
requirement will end in January. 
 
As a result, the Texas lawsuit contends, “the 
country is left with an individual mandate to 
buy health insurance that lacks any 
constitutional basis. . . . Once the heart of the 
ACA — the individual mandate — is 
declared unconstitutional, the remainder of 
the ACA must also fall.” 
 
Texas and the accompanying states have 
asked for a preliminary injunction that could 
suspend the entire law while the case plays 
out in court. 
 
But the administration disagrees with that 
position. Instead, Justice officials argue in 
their brief that the ACA’s insurance 
requirement will not become unconstitutional 
until January, so that “the injury imposed by 
the individual mandate is not sufficiently 
imminent” and that the judge could issue a 
final ruling in the case before then. 
 
O’Connor, who is hearing the suit, was 
appointed by President George W. Bush and 
has ruled against the ACA in other cases the 
past few years. 
 
Until Thursday’s filing, the Trump 
administration had not indicated its position 
on either this latest lawsuit or the Republican 
states’ effort to block the law while the case 
moved along. 
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From the moment he took office, President 
Trump has used all aspects of his executive 
power to sabotage the Affordable Care Act. 
He has issued executive orders, directed 
agencies to come up with new rules and used 
the public platform of the presidency in a 
blatant attempt to undermine the law. Indeed, 
he has repeatedly bragged about doing so, 
making statements like, “Essentially, we are 
getting rid of Obamacare.” 
But Mr. Trump isn’t a king; he doesn’t have 
the power to dispense with laws he dislikes. 
He swore to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States. That 
includes the requirement, set forth in Article 
II, that the president “take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.” 
Faithfully executing the laws requires the 
president to act reasonably and in good faith. 
It does not countenance the deliberate 
sabotage of an act of Congress. Put bluntly: 
Mr. Trump’s assault on Obamacare is illegal. 
Among Mr. Trump’s first acts in office was 
to issue an executive order instructing his 
agencies “to waive, defer, grant exemptions 
from, or delay the implementation of” any 
part of the Affordable Care Act that they 
could. That order has prompted a series of 
administrative actions aimed at undermining 
the law. 
To make it harder for people to enroll in 
Obamacare plans, for example, the 
administration shortened the open enrollment 
period on the health care exchanges from 
three months to six weeks; cut 90 percent of 
the funding that the exchanges had used to 
advertise open enrollment; and slashed the 
funding available to groups that help people 
navigate the complex enrollment process. 
To sow chaos in the insurance markets, Mr. 
Trump toyed for nine months with the idea of 
eliminating a crucial funding stream for 
Obamacare known as cost-sharing payments. 
After he cut off those funds, he boasted that 
Obamacare was “being dismantled.” 
When Congress declined to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act, as Mr. Trump had 
requested, he said that he was taking on that 
job himself: “So we’re going a little different 
route.” 
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This month, the Trump administration dealt 
what may be its biggest blow yet to the 
insurance markets. In a new rule, it 
announced that insurers will have more 
latitude to sell “short-term” health plans that 
are exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s 
rules. These plans were designed to provide 
people insurance for small gaps in coverage, 
like those created when switching jobs. They 
had previously been limited to three months. 
Under Mr. Trump’s new rule, however, such 
plans can last for 364 days and can be 
renewed for up to three years. That rule joins 
an earlier one that allowed businesses to join 
together to create “association health plans” 
that also evade the Affordable Care Act’s 
strictures. In effect, these rules are creating a 
cheap form of “junk” coverage that does not 
have to meet the higher standards of 
Obamacare. This sort of splintering of the 
insurance markets is not allowed under the 
Affordable Care Act as Congress drafted it. 
The Trump administration’s goal is not only 
to weaken the Affordable Care Act but also 
to trick the public into thinking, as opponents 
of the law like to say, that Obamacare is 
“collapsing under its own weight.” Let’s be 
clear: If the Affordable Care Act collapses, it 
is because the president demolished it. 
Never in modern American history has a 
president so transparently aimed to destroy a 
piece of major legislation. What makes Mr. 
Trump’s sabotage especially undemocratic is 
that Congress has repeatedly considered 
repealing the law — and repeatedly declined 
to do so. In addition, the Supreme Court has 
twice sustained the Affordable Care Act in 
the face of major legal challenges. Mr. 
Trump’s attempt to destroy the law any way 
he can is an unconstitutional usurpation of 
power. 
That is also the message of a lawsuit — the 
first of its kind — filed this month in federal 
court in Maryland. Brought by several 
plaintiffs including the cities of Chicago, 
Cincinnati and Columbus, the lawsuit 
recounts the “relentless and unlawful 
campaign to sabotage and, ultimately, to 
nullify” the Affordable Care Act. Taken 
individually, some of the Trump 
administration’s actions may be defensible. 
Taken together, they amount to a derogation 
of his constitutional duties. 
The lawsuit asks the court to strike down the 
administration’s new rules and to enjoin the 
president from further sabotage. To prevail, 
the plaintiffs may have to overcome some 
procedural hurdles, including questions about 
whether the courts have the authority or the 
institutional competence to prevent 
violations of Article II’s requirement that the 
president “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed” — especially given the wide 
discretion that presidents traditionally have to 
implement the laws. 
But if there is ever going to be a viable claim 
along these lines, this is it. After all, no court 
has ever held that the president has the power 
to consciously aim, in bad faith, to destroy 
Congress’ handiwork. Yet with his attacks on 
this law, that is precisely what Mr. Trump has 
been doing. No matter how you feel about 
Obamacare, we should all care about that.
